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MEASURE 7 REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In November 2000, Oregon voters shocked the land use community,
both locally and nationally, by approving Ballot Measure 7, which
represents a relatively new and extremely controversial principle
requiring compensation for so-called "regulatory takings."
The term "takings”1 derives from the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which prohibits the government from taking private
property for public use without just compensation. Early in the 20th
Century, as local governments began adopting zoning laws and other
laws that placed limitations on land use, the Supreme Court attempted
to address just how much of the landowner's rights had to be infringed
before a "takings" was considered to have occurred and a right to
compensation triggered. The court set forth some general guidelines,
which generally resulted in a subjective, case-by-case analysis, but
almost always focused on whether the landowner had any remaining
viable economic use of the property after the regulation was applied.
From the 1930s to the early 1970s, the takings clause received little
attention in the courts, at least at the national level. This same period
saw a marked increase in the amount of governmental regulation—
from Roosevelt's New Deal to environmental regulations to historic
preservation ordinances. Much of this new body of regulations
restricted how landowners could use their land. Beginning in the mid-
1970s, nearly every Supreme Court term has seen at least one high
profile case involving claims for "just compensation" due to a
restriction on the use of real property.
Early in this period of increased interest in the takings clause—in the
mid-1980s—a University of Chicago law professor, Richard Epstein,
developed the concept of a "regulatory" taking. This theory responded
to the frustration of many property owners with the threshold of loss
that had to be shown to establish the right to just compensation under
traditional takings law. Epstein argued that the right to compensation
should hinge on how much value the government "takes"—not on how
much value is left to the landowner.
Epstein's theories found a receptive audience in the administration of
President Ronald Reagan and resonated with property rights advocates
around the country. In fact, regulatory takings legislation was included
in the Republican Party's "Contract with America" in the 1994 mid-
term elections. And, the regulatory takings concept is at the heart of
Oregon's Ballot Measure 7. 
i
1 For the reader’s convenience, a glossary of terms is included as Appendix A.
Measure 7 was marketed to voters as a question of basic fairness: when
the government takes action that reduces the value of property, it
should pay for the reduction. Advertisements focused on a few
individuals who purchased land in established residential areas and
then were unable to build a residence on the land following adoption
of new regulations. Your committee interviewed a number of
landowners and confirmed that there have been cases of hardships
imposed by new regulations. A majority of the committee felt that
some form of relief is appropriate for these hardship cases.
However, in many cases of apparent hardship, there are extenuating
circumstances that were not widely discussed publicly prior to the
election and that are not given any weight in Measure 7's
compensation provisions. Instead, Measure 7 adopts a simplistic
approach to a complex problem. In addition, Measure 7 would
apparently have consequences not intended by its drafters, including
extending a right to compensation to property owners who purchase
land after a regulation is adopted but before the regulation is formally
applied to their specific parcel. We point out some of these defects in
Measure 7 and identify a number of elements that should be
considered in developing a compensation system for regulatory
takings. 
For reasons detailed in the body of the report, your committee
concluded that, although the Oregon land-use system is not perfect,
Measure 7 is not the proper vehicle for remedying hardships. Your
committee believes that some action should be taken to alleviate long-
standing frustrations stemming from Oregon's land use system and to
provide relief to those property owners who have clearly suffered
unfair hardship. Although implementation of Measure 7 has been
stayed pending Oregon Supreme Court review, the issues it raises are
likely to continue being controversial and the subject of future public
debate. Accordingly, we set forth a list of principles intended to strike a
balance between individual property rights and the interests of the
community. We believe these principles should guide any effort to
replace Measure 7. 
PRINCIPLES FOR "SON OF 7" SOLUTIONS
In the course of our work, we learned that the issues surrounding
compensation for governmental restrictions on the use of property are
extremely complex. We developed a set of principles that we believe
should guide any debate over compensation for land use regulations
and any legislative or initiative response to Measure 7. The principles
include the following:
1. Real property is a finite resource that is subject to increasing 
pressures due to population growth. Society has a strong 
interest in protecting and regulating the use of this resource.
ii
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2. Although Oregon's current land-use system may not be 
perfect, it is a legitimate and successful tool for accomplishing 
many goals that are in the public's interest.
3. The current constitutional and statutory framework of land 
use planning in some cases puts unfair burdens on certain
landowners, and those burdens should be compensated.  
Government regulations can cause a loss in the value of private
property that, in some cases, should be compensated.
4. The definition of a "taking" needs to be refined to set definite
parameters on the scope of compensable takings caused by 
land use regulations. 
5. Compensation should not be paid for alleged reductions in 
value resulting from regulations abating nuisances. The 
definition of a "nuisance" needs to be clarified and updated 
periodically to reflect evolving scientific knowledge, the 
cumulative impact of individual land-use decisions, and 
community values. 
6. Any compensation system should be codified in statutes rather
than the Oregon Constitution and should emphasize certainty 
and stability.
7. If the government is required to pay compensation to a prop-
erty owner, the government should acquire an enforceable 
property-related right. The government's right should be
transferable. Subsequent property owners should take 
ownership of the land subject to the government's acquired 
right to restrict use of the property without further 
compensation.
8. The government should have options in terms of the form of 
compensation (such as tax abatements and property swaps, 
among others). These should include the option to sell back 
the right to engage in the restricted use at a later date. 
9. Only losses of value above a certain threshold should be 
eligible for compensation.
10. The government should not guarantee unreasonable 
expectations of profit. Expectations are more likely to be 
reasonable if they involve continuation of a historic use or a 
use that was expressly permitted (e.g., under zoning laws) at 
the time the owner acquired the property. Speculation (e.g., of 
the assumed right to build a subdivision on farmland) should 
not be compensated.  
Executive Summary
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11. The compensation scheme should set a date that establishes 
the baseline of regulations or restrictions that will not be 
compensable. 
12. There should be a statute of limitations on submitting claims.
13. If an alternative to Measure 7 is presented to voters, it should 
include not only the compensation scheme, but also the 
corresponding funding mechanism.
14. Compensation for losses by regulatory takings should be 
funded, to the extent practicable, by revenue generated from 
property owners who benefit from changes in land-use 
regulation. This inverse corollary to takings compensation 
should be assessed upon the property owners' realization of 
profits. 
15. In reviewing specific proposed land use regulations, regulators 
should be required to take into account the burden on private
landowners (such as in a fiscal impact statement) versus the 
benefits to the public from the regulations and the amount of 
likely regulatory takings claims that will result.
Making land-use planning work for positive purposes while mitigating
negative side effects is a very challenging and critically important
undertaking. Oregon has wrestled with this dilemma since the state's
land-use system was created in 1973. Regardless of how the Oregon
Supreme Court rules on Measure 7, the issue is not going away. Your
committee thinks the time is right to take a comprehensive look at the
issue of compensation for regulatory takings. Any relief should be
narrowly tailored to cases of truly unfair hardships, taking into account
the principles we have set forth above.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Adopt Principles: The City Club should formally adopt each of
the fifteen principles. The Club should use these principles to 
evaluate any future proposals for a system of compensation for
the impact of government regulations on property values. 
2. Identify Appropriate Balance: The governor and Oregon 
Legislative Assembly should immediately begin a public 
process that will identify the appropriate balance between 
property rights and community interests that is acceptable to, 
and will be supported by, the majority of Oregonians.
3. Develop and Implement Limited Compensation Program:
The governor and Oregon Legislative Assembly should use the 
input from the public process and work with interested and 
affected parties to craft and implement a statutory 




4. Eliminate Measure 7 language from the Oregon Constitution:
If the Oregon Supreme Court upholds Measure 7, the Oregon 
Legislative Assembly should refer to voters a measure to 
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1I.   INTRODUCTION
In November 2000, Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 7, which
amended the Oregon Constitution to require state and local
governments to compensate property owners when regulations reduce
the value of real property. Measure 7 is generally viewed as the most
sweeping compensation provision for regulatory reductions in
property value in the entire United States. Many commentators viewed
passage of Measure 7 with shock and alarm, both because Oregon has
been cited as a national model of prudent land use policies and
because they believe that Measure 7 could spell the end of the current
system of land use planning in Oregon. 
Because of the projected impact of Measure 7 on Oregon's land use
system and the corresponding impact on individual citizens both in
Portland and in all of Oregon, the City Club of Portland authorized a
short-term committee to study the background, impetus, likely
impact, and future prospects of Measure 7.
A.   The Study Charge
The City Club asked us to prepare a report that would: 
! help readers understand the traditional basis for—and limitations 
on—government land use regulations in the U.S. Constitution. It 
should discuss the expanded interpretation of property "taking" 
advocated by the property rights proponents in recent years and the 
arguments for and against this interpretation. The study should help
readers understand the likely impacts of a formal recognition of 
"regulatory takings" on the current balance between private 
property interests and government activities and programs.
! review how other states have attempted to increase government  
sensitivity to the impacts of regulations on private property, or how 
they have required compensation for reductions in property values 
caused by government regulations. 
! explore what Oregonians think is the problem that needs to be fixed 
by Measure 7. 
! provide an overview of the major elements of Measure 7, and briefly 
summarize the problems and issues people have identified with the 
current language of the measure. 
! identify and discuss some alternatives to Measure 7, such as: minor 
language revisions; more substantial changes (such as a statute of 
limitations, or minimum thresholds for when compensation would 




! recommend how Oregonians and public and private sector
decision-makers and organizations should respond to Measure 7.
The City Club also encouraged us to take advantage of efforts
underway at the time (led by Governor Kitzhaber, the Oregon Attorney
General, the City of Portland, the Oregon League of Cities, and others)
to understand the impacts of Measure 7 and to evaluate different
possible responses.
The committee began its work in January 2001. From January through
April, the committee met twice a week, interviewing landowners,
lawyers, leaders of advocacy groups, planners, and appraisers, to learn
about the Constitutional standards for compensation, the Oregon land
use system, and how Measure 7 would likely change the existing
compensation rules. A list of witnesses is attached as Appendix B. A list
of resource materials is attached as Appendix C. From April through
November, the Committee met weekly to discuss and debate the issues
raised by Measure 7 and to prepare this report.
B.   Description of Report Structure
The report begins with a general discussion of the philosophy of
property ownership and the basis of the public's right to regulate use
of property. We then discuss the traditional interpretation of the
takings clause in the U.S. Constitution and how that interpretation has
evolved over time. Next, we introduce the concept of regulatory
takings, through a discussion of the views of Professor Richard Epstein,
and explain how adherents to Epstein's philosophy have attempted to
implement this philosophy at the national level.
We then turn to Oregon, first giving a brief overview of the Oregon land
use system and then addressing Measure 7, the embodiment of the
regulatory takings theory in Oregon. We point out some of the
interpretive problems of Measure 7 and finally propose some
principles that we believe should be considered in crafting a
replacement to Measure 7.
C.   Brief General Description of M7
Ballot Title: "Amends Constitution: Requires payment to landowner if
government regulation reduces property value."
3Major elements:
! If a regulation restricts use of private property and has the effect of 
reducing property value, the landowner is entitled to just 
compensation, including attorney fees and costs if compensation 
not paid within 90 days after filing of claim.
! Historically recognized nuisance laws are not considered to reduce 
property value.
! Regulations implementing federal mandates or prohibiting use of 
property for certain activities (e.g., pornography or gambling) do not
trigger a right to compensation.
! Compensation is due if a regulation was adopted, first enforced or 
first applied after the landowner acquired the property and the 
regulation continues to apply 90 days after the landowner applies 
for compensation.
! "Regulation" includes any enforceable enactment of government, 
and reduction in value includes the cost of complying with 
environmental regulations.
Measure 7 was presented to the voters as a question of basic fairness.
Advertisements focused on individual landowners who purchased
property in established residential areas and were unable to build due
to regulations adopted after the landowner purchased the property.
During the campaign, there was little public discussion of the
ambiguities or broad implications of Measure 7. The measure passed
53 percent to 47 percent. 
(See Appendix F for the full text of Measure 7.)
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II.   BACKGROUND
A.   Philosophical Underpinnings—Balancing Property Rights and 
Community Needs
When the community's needs impinge on private property rights, it
becomes apparent that we—in the United States and in Oregon—lack
consensus on the appropriate balance between these potentially
opposing ends. Defining the appropriate balance is at the heart of the
Measure 7 debate.
How one views Measure 7, and land use laws generally, depends in
large degree on one's view of property ownership. Although each
person has a general notion of what it means to own property in the
United States in 2001, in fact a wide spectrum of property ownership
systems is possible.
At one end of the spectrum would be a system of communal
ownership, where decisions about possession and use of the land are
made based on community consensus. In this system, the occupier of
property has few individual rights, and likely would not even have the
right to exclude other community members from the occupied
property. This type of system is commonly associated with the
indigenous peoples of North America.
At the other end of the spectrum would be a system where individuals
have the inalienable, absolute, and unrestricted right to possess and
use property over which they claim ownership. The community has no
right to restrict the uses to which others put their property, even if the
community is willing to compensate the property owner for the
restriction. This system is suited to undeveloped, sparsely populated
lands, where the impacts of particular uses are widely dispersed and
where other property owners are not close enough to feel the effects of
any impacts. This system is associated with the "wild, wild west" in the
days of 19th Century western expansion.
Most Oregonians, indeed most Americans, will find their philosophy
somewhere between the two ends of this spectrum. Most Americans
would agree that communal ownership of all property is not practical
or desirable.  Indeed, most would say that the private ownership of
property has contributed to the economic development and general
prosperity of the United States and gives individuals incentives to
preserve the value of their property. 
5At the same time, there is a broad consensus that the community has
the right to restrict the uses of property, e.g., to prevent harm to a
neighboring landowner or his land. Collectively, U.S. and state
constitutions, common law, statutes and ordinances, and social mores
comprise an "evolving social consensus" or a "social contract" that
simultaneously provides for private property while granting the
government the authority to regulate the use of private property. This
framework is not rigidly codified and unambiguous. Rather, its
flexibility derives from the fact that it is open to interpretation.
B.   National Context
1. U.S. Constitution
The U.S. Constitution is the appropriate starting point for
consideration of this topic because, although individuals may disagree
over its interpretation, it is the accepted governing authority and
philosophical foundation for private property rights in this country.
The Constitution, as a statement of broad philosophical principles
rather than a legal code, leaves room for interpretation according to
the reader's values. Federal courts serve as the official arbiters of the
U.S. Constitution.
The relevant provision of the Constitution is the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause, which states simply that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. On the one hand, the
Takings Clause establishes government's right to take private property
under certain circumstances (the power of "eminent domain"). On the
other hand, it also establishes that government has the obligation to
compensate property owners when it takes property. The Constitution
does not, however, define the broad terms "private property," "public
use," "just," and "compensation." 
It is generally understood that the "Takings Clause" was designed to
protect individuals against the physical appropriation of private
property by the government without compensation.2 The Framers of
the Constitution limited the Takings Clause to physical appropriation
because they could not have anticipated the broad range of regulations
and restrictions applied to property in modern America.3
2 In reviewing the history of the Takings Clause, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Blackmun
noted, "James Madison, author of the Takings Clause, apparently intended it to apply
only to direct, physical takings of property by the Federal Government." Lucas v. S.
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1057, n.23 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3 See, e.g., R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 28-29
(Harvard Univ. Press 1985).
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By the late 1800s, it was recognized that the government could take
property not only through physical possession of the property but also
by destroying its value entirely. For example, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 166, 181 (1871), a state government authorized
construction of a dam that flooded an upstream property. The U.S.
Supreme Court determined that the property owner was entitled to
compensation because the real property was "actually invaded" (by
water) just as if the government had occupied the property.
2. Growth In Government Regulation and Development of the Court
Definition of Takings
The United States changed dramatically from the time the
Constitution was written in the late 18th Century to the early 20th
Century. The country's size more than tripled, the population grew
exponentially, new transportation modes enabled people to migrate
and settle the "open" territory, and the economy began to shift from
agrarian towards an industrial base. State and local governments
attempted to deal with the changes associated with this growth and
complexity by adopting more regulations over land use and other
activities. These regulations caused friction between the rights of the
individual and the needs of the community. This friction was perhaps
all the more acute because many people had immigrated to America
precisely to find greater individual freedom and open space.
In the early 20th century, the U.S. Supreme Court struggled with
determining when state-imposed restrictions protected the public
health and safety versus when a regulation served broader
governmental goals. When the restriction was viewed as protecting
public health, safety, or welfare, a taking was held not to occur. The
principles underlying these holdings were:
a) No property owner has the inherent right to inflict injury upon 
the community, see, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 
(1915) (prohibition on brickyards not a taking); or 
b) The legislature has broad latitude to decide what restrictions
are in the community's best interests, see, e.g., Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning 
regulation preventing owner from using property for industrial
purposes in residential zone was not a taking, despite 75 
percent reduction in value). 
If the court viewed the regulation as serving governmental goals other
than public health, safety, or welfare, a taking was held to occur on the
Background
7theory that "a strong public desire to improve the public condition is
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (law requiring coal mine operators to leave
enough coal in the ground to support surface structures was a taking).
Beginning as early as the 1950s, indisputable evidence of severe air and
water pollution introduced the concept of environmental protection
into the American consciousness. People organized efforts to clean up
the environment, and to pressure Congress to pass laws regulating
pollution. Although not necessarily styled as land use laws, the effect
of federal legislation was to restrict the permissible uses of property.
In addition to the environmental movement, the 1970s saw the rise of
the historic preservation movement in response to a rapid depletion of
the nation's stock of historically significant buildings. Many historic
preservation ordinances prohibited property owners from making
changes to structures of historic significance. In fact, a case involving
the mandated preservation of the Grand Central Terminal in New York
City was the first significant Takings Clause case to reach the U.S.
Supreme Court since the 1920s.
In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the
Court held that applying New York City's historic preservation
ordinance to block the construction of a 40-story office tower atop
Grand Central Station was not a "taking." The court set out a
comprehensive, yet vague, list of "influential factors" for fixing the line
between compensable and noncompensable regulation. These factors
were (1) the economic impact of the government action; (2) the extent
to which the government action interfered with reasonable
investment-backed expectations; and (3) the "character" of the
government action. In a narrow majority, the Court also held that the
Takings Clause applies only to the impact of restrictions on a property
as a whole, and not on components of the property (e.g., subsurface
mining or vertical development of airspace). 
The court recognized that, notwithstanding the test it articulated,
determining whether a government regulation is a taking cannot be
based on mechanical application of fixed principles. Rather, it is a
determination based on "fairness and justice," combining close
scrutiny of the facts with ad hoc, case-by-case analysis. Because of the
injection of subjective notions of "fairness," this test did not cure the
unpredictability of the law.
3. National Property Rights Movement
With the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980, a backlash
began against the increased regulations that marked the 1960s and
MEASURE 7 REPORT
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1970s. Included in this backlash was a movement that some
commentators have referred to as a national property rights move-
ment. Today, the movement has grown to include a network of local,
state, and national property rights groups across the country. The
movement seeks to protect and expand the right of property owners to
use their property and to limit government regulation of private
property.
The property rights movement gained momentum in 1985, when an
influential legal scholar, Professor Richard Epstein, published a book,
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, which
criticized the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to takings cases for most
of the 20th Century and advocated expanding the takings concept to
include "partial takings" and "regulatory takings." Shortly after the
publication of Epstein's book, property rights advocates began
advancing many of Epstein's views.
Adherents to the "property rights" movement have adopted a two-
pronged strategy to advance their views on the proper balance
between individual property rights and governmental regulations. The
first prong focuses on an effort to influence judicial decisions to
expand the scope of government regulations that are held to be
compensable "takings" under the U.S. Constitution. The second prong
focuses on urging legislatures to pass laws limiting regulation, either
by requiring compensation for regulation-induced decreases in
property values, or by inserting procedural obstacles to the adoption of
regulations, or a combination of the two. 
A key goal of the property rights movement is to substantially raise the
cost to government of implementing restrictions on the use of private
property. Property rights advocates hope that these increased costs will
lead governmental agencies to rescind or waive existing regulations
and/or significantly reduce the adoption of new regulations.
Epstein's Theory of Regulatory Takings: Because the judicial and
legislative strategies have both drawn from Epstein's writings, any
consideration of property rights has to consider his influence. His
philosophy has shaped much of the thinking and law in this area for
the past 15 years, and permeates the thinking of Measure 7
proponents. 
Epstein says his 1985 book is about:
"…the conflict between the original constitutional design and the
expansion of state power. At a general level it argues that the system of
limited government and private property is not elastic enough to
Background
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that preceded or followed it." He argues that "the eminent domain
clause and parallel clauses in the Constitution render constitutionally
infirm or suspect many of the heralded reforms and institutions of the
twentieth century: zoning, rent control, workers' compensation laws,
transfer payments, progressive taxation. Where these governmental
innovations do survive in principle, it is often in a truncated and
limited form." (Takings, Preface, p. x.)
Epstein argues that the majority of government limitations or
intervention in the use of private property is inappropriate in most
cases, unless government compensates the property owner for the
impact of the government action.
Epstein contended that the U.S. Supreme Court's takings cases
focused too much on what use was left to the property owner and not
enough on the value of what had been taken. Sometimes characterized
as a "partial takings analysis," this view states that compensation may
be due even if the property owner is able to continue to use his
property in the same way he always had, but is prevented by
government action from putting the property to a different use. 
A second dominant theme in Epstein's work is skepticism over the
breadth of the government's "police power," i.e., the power to restrict
private conduct to protect public health and safety. To Epstein, the
fundamental question is whether the regulation is an attempt to
control the harmful effects of a property owner's actions on other
people or property or whether the regulation attempts to confer a
benefit on the general public. In either case, the regulation is
permissible (because it is done for a public end), but in the second
situation, Epstein contends the taking must be compensated. Stated
another way, when the government regulates to abate a nuisance, no
compensation is due. When it regulates to curtail a use that is not a
nuisance but achieves some other public benefit (e.g., to preserve a
view), compensation is due. Epstein advocated a definition of
"nuisance" based on a narrow set of uses historically recognized under
common law—generally, involving some type of physical invasion of a
neighboring property.
A final theme in Epstein's work is advocacy of heightened scrutiny of
the stated justifications for governmental actions. He would not defer
to legislative judgments about the public welfare and safety. 
Many of Epstein's themes dovetailed with the philosophy of President
Reagan, who was beginning his second term as Epstein's book was
published. President Reagan, and his successor, President Bush, 
shaped the takings debate in significant ways.4 In 1982, legislation
restructured the U.S. Court of Claims (now known as the Court of
Federal Claims) and established the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,
both of which were vested with exclusive jurisdiction to hear takings
claims in excess of $10,000 against the U.S. government. President
Reagan appointed every judge to the Court of Federal Claims.
Presidents Reagan and Bush combined appointed a majority of the
judges on the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Judicial Prong: The influence of Epstein and the Reagan and Bush
appointees is seen in three recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Lucas
v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. 99-2047
(June 28, 2001).  Lucas involved a ban on new home construction on
barrier islands in South Carolina, because the state concluded that the
construction was causing erosion of the islands. The ban prevented
Lucas from building houses on two building lots that he had
purchased for $795,000 and effectively prohibited any economic use of
the property. The court held that a regulation that deprives a
landowner of all economic use constitutes a "taking," unless the state's
property and nuisance laws restricted the use of the property when it
was purchased. For example, the owner of a lakebed who is prevented
from filling the lake if this would cause flooding on other people's
property would not be entitled to compensation. Likewise, the owner
of a nuclear power plant who is told to dismantle the plant because it
sits on an earthquake-prone fault line would not be entitled to
compensation. In these situations, the state does not owe
compensation because its proscription does not prohibit a use that
would previously have been permissible. According to the court, the
fact that a particular use has been engaged in for a long time by other
similarly situated landowners—and there were many existing homes
near the property purchased by Lucas—argues against a finding that




4 In his memoir, Reagan Administration Solicitor General Charles Fried offers the
following analysis of Reagan's Executive Order 12630 (March 15, 1988), which generally
required federal agencies to follow Epstein's philosophy in adopting regulations:
"Attorney General [Edwin] Meese and his young advisors—many drawn from the ranks
of the then fledgling Federalist Societies and often devotees of the extreme libertarian
views of Chicago law professor Richard Epstein—had a specific, aggressive, and, it
seemed to me, quite radical project in mind: to use the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment as a severe brake upon federal and state regulation of business and
property. The grand plan was to make government pay compensation as for a taking of
property every time its regulations impinged too severely on a property right—limiting
the possible uses for a parcel of land or restricting or tying up a business in regulatory
red tape. If the government labored under so severe an obligation, there would be, to say
the least, much less regulation."
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In Dolan, an Oregon case, the property owner applied for a permit to
expand a retail store and parking lot and to build an adjacent small
shopping center. The city granted the permit with the conditions that
the owner dedicate to the city (a) the portion of the property within a
100-year floodplain, and (b) an additional 15-foot wide strip of land to
be used for a bike and pedestrian path. In holding that the property
owner was entitled to compensation, the majority, comprised entirely
of Reagan and Bush appointees, held that higher scrutiny is necessary
where a government decision relates to a single parcel (as opposed to
general zoning rules) or requires an outright dedication of land to
public use. The Court held that there must be an "essential nexus"
between the articulated governmental interest and the conditions for
regulatory approval, and there should be a rough proportionality
between the conditions for regulatory approval and the impact of the
proposed development. 
In Palazzolo, a Rhode Island case, an individual purchased property,
most of which was salt marsh subject to tidal flooding. Government
agencies rejected the owner's applications to fill and develop the
property based on state regulations that protected the salt marshes
from development. The regulations were in effect when the individual
became the legal owner of the property. A 5-4 majority of the U.S.
Supreme Court justices ruled that landowners are not barred from
bringing takings claims merely because a particular regulation was in
effect prior to the time the landowner obtained title to the property.
Legislative Prong: Although the popular press did not emphasize
them, the 1994 Republican-sponsored Contract with America included
compensation provisions for regulatory actions that reduced the fair
market value of the regulated "portion" of the property by 20 percent
or more. These provisions, which bear striking resemblance to many
features of Measure 7, were included in the Job Creation and Wage
Enhancement Act of 1995. This act, which is set forth in Appendix H,
passed the House of Representatives but died in the Senate. 
Property rights advocates have had more success at the state level.
During the 1990s, all the states considered property rights laws, and
about half the states adopted some form of law. Measure 7, if
implemented, would provide property rights protections than far
exceed those provided by similar laws currently effect in other states.
4. Characteristics of Different Types of State Laws
State "property rights" laws generally fall into four categories:
1. Attorney General review of proposed regulation.
2. State and local agency assessment of proposed regulations.
MEASURE 7 REPORT
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3. Compensation to land owner for regulatory takings.
4. Dispute resolution.
Category 1—Attorney General Review: These statutes do not alter the
definition of a taking in either the federal or state constitutions. Rather,
the intent of the legislation is to avoid adoption of regulations that,
under existing takings law, would likely lead to takings claims. It is
difficult to determine the impact of these laws because advice
provided to state agencies may be protected by attorney client
privilege, which makes it difficult to determine if the attorney general
found a proposed regulation subject to takings provisions or whether
agencies have in fact revised proposed regulations. Moreover,
attorneys general have noted that it is often difficult to determine
whether a proposed regulation would constitute a takings until it is
applied to a specific piece of property.
Category 2—State Agency and Local Government Assessment: This
type of legislation typically requires the attorney general to prepare
guidelines to assist state agencies and local governments to conduct
an impact analysis to determine likely takings implications of
proposed regulations. Some statutes in this category require
government agencies to prepare a written evaluation of regulations
that specifically weighs the burden on private landowners against the
benefits to the public from the regulation and to consider less
burdensome alternatives. Many are informal and undocumented,
making it nearly impossible to determine what conclusions were
reached by agencies. 
Category 3—Compensation for Regulatory Takings: Measure 7 would
fall into this category. Typically, there is a minimum threshold in
property value reduction before a landowner will have standing to
assert a claim (e.g., 25 percent reduction in value). In Florida, the
threshold test is whether the regulation imposes an "inordinate
burden" on the property owner. We focus more on Florida below,
because it is the state with the closest analogue to Measure 7. 
Category 4—Conflict Resolution: This is the newest approach to land
use. As the name implies, it is based upon negotiation, mediation and
arbitration in contrast to traditional litigation. The theory is that
conflict resolution would be employed to settle disputes stemming
from failure to satisfy either agency assessment or compensation
proposals. Due to the nature of alternative dispute resolution (i.e.,
consensual outcomes that may or may not be public record), it is
virtually impossible to determine the impact of these laws.
Background
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Two States have Overturned Property Rights Laws: During the 1990s,
at least two state legislatures passed property protection laws that were
subsequently overturned by voters.
In 1992, the Arizona legislature passed a law that required the state
Attorney General to analyze every new proposed regulation to
determine whether it "affected" the value of a private property owner's 






























Source: Jacobs, State Property Rights Laws, p.11.
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real property and, if it did, the agency proposing the regulation had to
estimate the cost of compensating property owners. This requirement
effectively froze new regulations due to the administrative burden of
estimating the costs. Arizona voters repealed this law by a margin of 60
percent to 40 percent in a November 1994 referendum.
In July 1995, the Washington legislature passed a law similar to
Measure 7 requiring compensation to landowners for any diminution
in value caused by governmental regulation. Before this law could take
effect, a citizen initiative referred the law to voters, who repealed the
law in November 1995 by a margin of 60 percent to 40 percent.
Florida—The Most Advanced Property Compensation Law in Effect:
Florida passed two separate laws in 1995 and is one of the only states
to have a functioning compensation system analogous to the system
contemplated by Measure 7. The experience in Florida provides some
insights as to what might happen in Oregon if Measure 7 is upheld and
becomes law. A detailed summary of the Florida laws is set forth in
Appendix D.
One law, the Florida compensation statute, creates a cause of action
for landowners who believe that a government regulation enacted after
May 11, 1995, has placed an "inordinate burden" on their property,
without actually resulting in a taking under the Florida or U.S.
Constitutions. It defines an "inordinate burden" as an action that
either denies a property owner his or her reasonable, investment-
backed expectations or vested rights, or that forces the property owner
to bear a disproportionate cost for the public good.
The other law, the Dispute Resolution Act, establishes a mediation
process for property rights disputes. Although more than 100 claims
had been initiated under both acts (compensation and dispute
resolution) through July 2001, the Florida Attorney General's office
indicates that a court has not ordered any claims to be paid under
either act. However governments have settled a number of the claims
out of court. The details of the settlements have not been disclosed.
However, the sample of claims in the table below may give the reader a
sense of the nature and dollar amount of the claims filed under the
compensation act. 
It is too soon to tell what the ultimate impact of these laws will be. To
date, Florida has not been ordered to pay compensation for claims.
However, Florida's law does not provide compensation for regulations
enacted prior to the effective date of the compensation statute,
limiting the number of property owners who would have immediate 
Background
15
claims. In this regard, it is interesting to note a five-fold increase in
compensation claims in Florida between 1996 and 1999.It is also
interesting to note the broad array of regulations that have triggered
claims for compensation, including general zoning laws that rarely
give rise to takings claims under existing constitutional standards. 
Critics warn that the Florida laws will have a "chilling effect" on
government regulation. They warn that governments will be reluctant
to adopt new regulations needed to serve the public good because of
the cost of compensating property owners. It is unclear the extent to
which governments in Florida are choosing not to adopt new
regulations because of compensation requirements. 
5. Current State of National Law
On the judicial level, it is fair to say that the constitutional law of
"takings" continues to be complex and outcomes can be
unpredictable. Since the 1980s, there has been a decided shift towards
greater scrutiny and skepticism of governmental restrictions on
development. Courts have required clearer articulation of the public
interest in restricting property use, and demanded a better
demonstration of how the restriction will achieve the articulated




Proposed industrial plant within 300 feet of
residential property subjected to conditional use
permit
$4,140,000
Elimination of design bonuses, which reduced
maximum allowable floor area ratio for property
$1,040,000
Beachfront protection ordinance reduced
developable portion of property
$710,000
Inclusion of property in designated historical district Unknown (alternate
relief of exclusion from
historical district
requested)
Ordinance (approved in referendum) limiting
building heights to five stories
Unknown
County resolution prohibited owner from removing
fill from property
$2,931,896
Adoption of ordinance prevented owner from





all economic use of property, the government must show that the
proposed uses could have been prohibited under common law
nuisance principles. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has embraced the
notion of considering the many aspects of property ownership
separately and requiring compensation where there is a taking of any
portion of the property rights. 
On the legislative level, the movement to increase the circumstances
when property owners are entitled to compensation due to regulations
seems to have lost steam.  Both property rights and land use advocates
are watching Florida carefully to see the impact of their laws.
C.   Oregon Context
1. Oregon Constitution vs. U.S. Constitution
Even before Measure 7, the Oregon Constitution had a "takings
clause." Specifically, Section 18 of Article I, provides,
It appears that the Oregon Constitution, at least under current judicial
interpretations, is less likely than the U.S. Constitution to support a
finding that a particular restriction constitutes a taking. In a 1998 case
(Dodd v. Hood River County), the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the differences between the U.S. and Oregon Constitutions.
The court indicated that, under the Oregon Constitution, there would
not be a taking if the court determines that there is still some
"substantial beneficial use" of the property. Under the U.S.
Constitution, however, there could still be a taking if the economic
impact of the regulation excessively interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations. 
2. The Oregon Land Use System
History: The Oregon legislature first authorized land use regulation by
incorporated cities in 1919. After an initial challenge, the Oregon
Background
"Private property shall not be taken for public use, nor the
particular services of any man be demanded, without just
compensation; nor except in the case of the state, without such
compensation first assessed and tendered; provided, that the
use of all roads, ways and waterways necessary to promote the
transportation of the raw products of mine or farm or forest or
water for beneficial use or drainage is necessary to the
development and welfare of the state and is declared a public
use."
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Supreme Court upheld this authority in 1925. In 1947, the legislature
extended zoning authority to counties. In 1969, the legislature passed
Senate Bill (SB) 10, which required every city and county within the
state to adopt a comprehensive plan and enact zoning regulations. The
voters upheld this legislation in a legislative referral in 1970. However,
the bill had significant shortcomings, including lack of an enforcement
mechanism to require local governments to act, and many local
governments simply ignored the legislation. In 1973, the Legislature
passed SB 100 creating a statewide land use planning system. 
Structure and Operation: Although the details of this system have
changed since SB 100 was passed, the Oregon system basically
provides for a state agency charged with setting statewide planning
goals and assuring compliance with those goals at the local level
through comprehensive plans and implementing ordinances. The
statewide agency charged with adopting the goals and reviewing local
ordinances is the Land Conservation and Development Commission
(LCDC). The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) is the adjudicatory
authority created to review land use decisions challenged as being
inconsistent with the statewide goals. Many have hailed this statewide
land use system as a national model.
LCDC establishes state planning policy through the adoption or
amendment of goals (planning standards) that apply to state agencies,
local governments, and special districts. The goals are set forth in
Appendix E. LCDC must make a finding of need before adopting or
amending a goal, and the goals must have a "reasonable degree of
flexibility" in how they are implemented. In addition, LCDC must
assess the effects of goals on the economy and property interests and
must consider alternative actions that might be used with lesser
economic effect. There is a detailed process for adopting or amending
goals, including extensive public hearings throughout the state.
Generally, a new or amended goal cannot take effect for at least one
year after adoption.
Local governments and special districts must adopt comprehensive
plans that conform to the statewide goals. Each county is responsible
for coordinating all planning activities affecting land use within the
county. Metro is the designated planning coordinator for the Portland
metropolitan area.
Local government plans must be periodically reviewed for continued
compliance with the statewide goals. When LCDC determines that the
local government plans are in compliance, it "acknowledges" the
plans. LCDC orders regarding acknowledgment of local plans,
implementing ordinances, and other reviews are subject to review in
the Oregon Court of Appeals.
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Previous Legislative Attempts to Provide for Compensation: Late in
the 1973 Legislative session, Oregon Governor Tom McCall introduced
a companion bill to SB 100 dealing with compensation for regulatory
inequities. This bill, SB 849, the Land Value Adjustment Act of 1973,
was developed by an advisory committee of planners, economists,
developers and realtors. SB 849 tried to satisfy public and private
interests in land by recognizing property as a set of collective rights,
privileges, and interests. The idea was that when a land use ordinance
or regulation infringed upon a portion of those rights, the value of that
portion could be separated from the collectivity and be compensated.
Although there evidently was great interest in compensation, there was
disagreement about the details in SB 849 and there was no mechanism
to fund compensation. Consequently, a clause was added to SB 100
charging the new Joint Legislative Committee on Land Use to study
and make recommendations to the next Legislative Assembly on a
compensation program. 
Governor McCall recognized that land use regulations would work a
hardship on some property owners in some cases. In 1974, Governor
McCall proposed a compensation mechanism that has become known
as "windfalls for wipeouts." McCall suggested that "the landowner who
suffers a monetary loss as a result of government action should be
compensated to some degree for the forced change in his expectations.
Second, it is equally important for the public to capture some of the
benefit from government decisions which increase land values. Ideally,
both sides of this proposition will balance." (McCall, Tom, Inroads
Toward Positive Land Use Management: A Land Value Adjustment
Proposal, August 29, 1974.)
A series of studies of compensation alternatives and proposed
legislation followed in the 1970s and 1980s, none of which bore fruit.
Nevertheless, this effort has produced a significant body of research
and ideas for mitigating the tension between public and private
interests in land use. Some of these ideas are incorporated into this
report.
Although Oregon currently does not have a direct compensation
mechanism for reductions in property value, it has provided for
significant property tax abatements for farm and forest land since
before the passage of SB 100. The underlying theory of these
abatements is to tax these lands based on their value as farm land or
forest land, and not based on the higher value that the lands might be
worth if they were developed for a non-agricultural use.
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3. Proponents and Opponents of Oregon's Land Use System
Perhaps because Oregon's was the first state-wide land use structure in
the nation, it has attracted a number of passionate supporters and
detractors.  One of the prime factors in the adoption of Oregon's land
use system was a desire to protect farm and forest resource lands. The
land use system has evolved to pursue additional goals, but in many
ways the land use system highlights and exacerbates the friction
between urban and rural Oregonians, between the resource-based
economy and conservationists, and between those on the "community
needs" and "individual rights" ends of the property rights spectrum. A
significant number of Oregonians believe that the land use system is
biased in favor of environmental goals and a particular form of urban
density that are imposed by bureaucrats and not supported by a
majority of citizens.
This undercurrent has been evident from the initial passage of SB 100
in 1973. As early as 1976, a citizen-backed initiative would have
repealed SB 100. A City Club committee recommended a "no" vote on
the ballot measure, but stated in its conclusions, "Enough resentment
has accumulated from the issue of compensation of landowners for
property value losses due to land use restriction that the time has
come for the legislature to solve this problem as provided in S.B. 100."
Voters rejected the measure, with 61 percent voting against.
In 1978, another ballot measure was introduced to modify the land use
regulatory structure established by SB 100. The 1978 measure would
have repealed the statewide land use planning goals established by
LCDC and would have required the legislature itself to establish
statewide goals. Under the measure, the legislature could impose land
use or zoning restrictions on "areas of statewide significance."
However, "adversely affected private land owners" would be entitled to
"just compensation." In recommending a vote against the measure, a
City Club committee report stated, "At the worst, Measure 10 is an
artfully contrived, even deceptive, attempt to accomplish by
indirection the effective repeal of LCDC and any meaningful state
involvement in the planning process—the same outright repeal
rejected by the voters two years ago." The measure failed, with 57
percent of voters voting against.
A final initiative attempt to significantly change the framework of SB
100 occurred in 1983. The overall impact of the 1983 measure would
have been to devolve most land use planning decisions to the local
level and reduce the impact of statewide planning goals. A primary
catalyst behind the 1983 measure was a concern for a shortage of
developable industrial land, especially in the Portland area.
Interestingly, the arguments in favor of the measure, at least as
identified by the City Club committee analyzing the measure, focused
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on the alleged impediment of land use planning to statewide
economic development rather than the impact to individual property
owners. This measure also failed, with 55 percent of the voters against.
There has not been a recent referendum on the Oregon land use
system. However, there is anecdotal evidence that residents are
becoming frustrated with some of its effects. One specific lightning rod
for contention has been the issue of urban growth boundaries
("UGBs"). UGBs are some of the most visible, admired or reviled, and
distinctive characteristics of the Oregon land use system. They were
created in the 1970s by local governments to satisfy Goal 14. This goal
defined the criteria for UGB design, but the actual boundaries were
drawn by local governments through a public process, which included
testimony of the local communities. Since the 1990s each UGB is
required to include adequate land for the community's residential,
industrial, commercial, and recreational needs for 20 years. To ensure
room for expansion and development, these boundaries are adjusted
every five to seven years.
Planners consider UGBs to be an important tool to divide urban and
rural land. The reduction of sprawl through a UGB arguably results in
more ordered and efficient extension of services and infrastructure
and reduces conflicts between rural and urban uses. UGB proponents
claim they save taxpayer dollars, reduce sprawl and traffic congestion,
save farm and forest land, and make planning more effective. 
Critics of UGBs claim they establish artificial barriers, driving up land
prices inside the UGB and making housing more expensive. They also
assert that UGBs and related high-density requirements lead to small
lots and unnecessary crowding, forcing developers to build a product
that most homebuyers do not want.
It is unclear the extent to which frustration over Oregon's land use
system, including UGBs, influenced voting on Measure 7.
The conflicting themes inherent in the Oregon land use system have
been debated by a number of groups, but the most notable advocates
are Oregonians in Action on the side of property rights and 1000
Friends of Oregon on the side of statewide planning and "smart"
development. 
Oregonians in Action: Oregonians in Action (OIA) is "an association of
property owners working together to protect property rights in
Oregon." This lobbying organization, which promotes land use        reg-
ulatory reform, was established in its current form in 1989 by Frank
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Nims (a cherry farmer) and Bill Moshofsky (former Vice President,
Georgia Pacific Corporation). Based in Tigard, OIA has a staff of six
(with volunteers) and reports that it has over 8,000 supporters. 
OIA opposes what it perceives as excessive and/or unfair land use reg-
ulations, including:
! Regulations of rural land that outlaw dwellings and land divisions.
! Restrictions on rural and urban land related to LCDC Goal 5 
(concerning natural resources, scenic and historic areas, and open 
spaces).
! Systemic problems, including inflexible "planning" rules, excessive
conditions on building permits, insufficient notice concerning new 
regulations to affected landowners, and burdensome procedures for 
appeals. 
! OIA efforts focus on land use and property rights. It has sought to 
ease zoning, require compensation for regulatory takings, and 
provide relief from unfair procedures. Building on its earlier work, 
OIA served as a leading advocate for the passage of Measure 7.
Oregonians in Action Legal Center, a separate nonprofit organization
that has been active since 1991, provides legal services without charge
to landowners who may have cases that could result in precedent-
setting court decisions. The Legal Center is most famous for its role in
representing Dolan, in the landmark case of Dolan vs. City of Tigard
(See page _____). OIA also has an Education Center, which educates
landowners, the media and citizens about state, local and federal land
use laws and regulations. 
1000 Friends of Oregon: 1000 Friends of Oregon is a nonprofit
charitable organization founded in 1975 by Governor Tom McCall and
Henry Richmond as "the citizens' voice for land use planning that
protects Oregon's quality of life from the effects of growth." Based in
Portland, 1000 Friends has a staff of 13 and reports that it has over
5,000 members.
1000 Friends states that it works to:
! Conserve Oregon's productive farm, forest and range lands.
! Promote compact, livable cities with affordable housing, green 
spaces and transportation alternatives.
! Protect natural resources and scenic areas along the coast and 
across Oregon.
! Defend the opportunities for citizens to participate in the planning 
decisions affecting Oregon and their communities.
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These objectives are to be achieved through Oregon's statewide
program to plan for Oregon's growth and in conjunction with other
state, local and regional land use planning efforts.
1000 Friends' work is a combination of advocacy, education and
research. 1000 Friends also coordinates a statewide network of 13 local
and regional organizations with a strong interest in land use and
growth management. 
For activities outside of the scope of a nonprofit charitable
organization, the 1000 Friends Action Fund handles lobbying activities
at the Oregon Legislature; monitoring, evaluating, and publicizing the
records of state and local officials on land use and transportation
issues; and participating in state and local initiative campaigns.
1000 Friends campaigned against Measure 7 as a serious threat to
Oregon's land use system because the high cost of mandated          pay-
ments to property owners would lead to the severe weakening of a
broad range of land use protections. Since the 2000 election, 1000
Friends has argued that state and local governments are not
authorized to waive the requirements of Oregon's land use system to
avoid compensation claims.
D.   2000 Measure 7 
1. Source of Measure 7
Stuart Miller was the chief petitioner for Measure 7.  Your committee
interviewed Stuart and Becky Miller to review the provisions of
Measure 7 and to obtain background on how the measure came about.
The Millers purchased a home in southwest Portland for $63,000 in
1989. The property consisted of two adjacent R-7 zoned lots of one-
half and one-sixth acre, respectively, with a house on the smaller lot.
Their plan was to live in the home on the smaller lot, to subdivide the
vacant one-half acre lot into two or three parcels, and to use one of the
subdivided parcels for an addition to their existing home. 
During 1991-92, the City of Portland implemented environmental
overlay regulations for streams and creeks. Basically, the overlay
prohibits building within a specified buffer zone on either side of the
stream or creek. The Millers' undeveloped one-half acre lot had a
stream cutting diagonally across it. An overlay was established for this
stream to reduce phosphate levels and promote the return of the
cutthroat salmon to the Fanno Creek watershed. Because of the
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location of the stream on the property, the property became essentially
undevelopable. The value of the Miller's one-half acre lot depreciated
from $38,000 to $13,000 according to the Multnomah County tax
assessor. Their objections to the overlay and their efforts to have the
City compensate them for their loss were unsuccessful. 
In the course of their involvement with policy reviews and appeals, the
Millers met other property owners whose ability to develop or use their
land was severely curtailed or eliminated by restrictions that were
imposed sometime after they had purchased the property. They had
the sense that this was a bigger problem that needed to be addressed.5
At that time, both Becky and Stuart Miller worked for Oregon
Taxpayers United (OTU). Ms. Miller described her plight to Bill
Sizemore, the director of OTU. As it happened, Sizemore had already
drafted an initiative to address these types of regulatory takings, and
he showed it to the Millers. The Millers indicated that the draft
initiative appeared to be the answer to the problem they had
experienced with the environmental overlay. They had the draft
initiative reviewed by Dave Hunnicutt, legal counsel for Oregonians in
Action (OIA), and the Millers told your committee that they incorpo-
rated each and every revision to the initiative suggested by Hunnicutt.
OTU supported the signature drive to get the initiative on the
November 2000 ballot. However, because OTU was working to place a
number of other measures on the November 2000 ballot, OIA picked
up the sponsorship role for Measure 7 as a way to take their issue
directly to the Oregon voters. Bill Moshofsky, the President of the OIA
Legal Center, told your committee that OIA promoted Measure 7, even
though OIA had some reservations about some of the language in the
initiative. (This testimony was contrary to the testimony of the Millers,
who stated that they had incorporated each and every change
recommended by OIA's legal counsel.)
Measure 7 was one of 26 measures for voter consideration in
November 2000. Discussion of Measure 7 during the campaign was
limited primarily to brief capsules ("fairness," "cost," and "destroying
Oregon's land use system"). It did not become a focal issue, and few
commentators thought it had any chance of passage; the campaign
was dominated by the national election and other initiatives supported
directly by OTU. However, Measure 7 passed by a 53 percent to 47
percent margin. 
5 A sampling of anecdotes from other property owners is attached as Appendix G.  Your
committee has not researched all the claims of these property owners in detail.  We
include these anecdotes to give readers a sense of the frustrations expressed by property
owners that apparently resonated with Measure 7 voters.
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2. Provisions and Meaning of Measure 7
The full text of Measure 7 is set forth in Appendix F. The main
provisions are described below.
Compensation for Restrictive Regulations on Private Real Property:
The purpose of this clause was to make compensation for the
imposition of public uses on private property a constitutional
requirement, with compensation to be determined by change in
property value. In other words, under Measure 7, the property owner is
entitled to compensation if a regulation "restricts" use of the
property—a full-fledged "taking" is not a prerequisite to a
compensation claim. Presumably, the right to compensation would
exist even if the restriction were imposed to protect an important
safety, health and welfare goal, e.g., prohibiting construction in an area
subject to flooding or imposing seismic design standards.
Measure 7 would apply to state and local governments. A reduction in
value of property includes not just a reduction in the fair market value
of the property, but the net cost to the landowner of an affirmative
obligation to protect, provide, or preserve wildlife habitat, natural
areas, wetlands, ecosystems, scenery, open space, historical,
archaeological or cultural resources, or low income housing. 
Measure 7 contemplates cash compensation. Other forms of
compensation, such as tax abatements or transferable development
rights, would not qualify as compensation for Measure 7 purposes. 
The Millers said they intended for Measure 7 to provide compensation
only for loss in property value from decisions that restricted the use of
that specific property. Claims for lost development profits, or for gains
not realized because of the government denial of a request for
upzoning, would not be compensable. Likewise, the impact on
property value by a zoning or other decision on an adjacent property
would not be covered.
Exemptions and Limitations. Measure 7 contains three main
categories of exemptions and limitations under which compensation
would be either barred or reduced: "historically and commonly
recognized" nuisance laws, certain businesses, and federally-mandat-
ed regulations.
a. Nuisance laws. This clause excludes nuisance laws from the scope of
compensable regulations, but limits the scope of the exception to  
"historically and commonly recognized" nuisance laws.  There is no 
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single, fixed definition of what constitutes a legal nuisance. In fact, it
has been observed that "[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable
jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 
'nuisance.'"6 Although there are a few well established activities that
have been codified as "nuisances" under Oregon law (including 
prostitution, gambling, and illegal delivery of controlled 
substances), drawing a bright line between a law that promotes the 
general welfare (which would not be considered a law to abate a 
nuisance) and a law to prevent harm to the public (which would be 
considered a law to abate a nuisance) is virtually impossible. All laws
that promote the public welfare also operate at some level to 
prevent harm.
So, for example, one could debate whether general zoning laws 
prevent harm or promote the general welfare. If it is determined that
zoning rules promote the general welfare rather than prevent harm 
to other property, they would not be within the Measure 7 
exemption. A property owner affected by zoning rules that restrict 
the use of property would likely be eligible for compensation under 
Measure 7. 
In addition, limiting the exception to "historically and commonly
recognized" nuisance laws effectively means that regulations 
limiting activities that become recognized as nuisances in the future
would be compensable.
b. Federally Mandated Regulations. This section excludes from the 
class of compensable regulations any rules imposed as a result of 
federal law; but it, in turn, limits that exclusion to the minimum 
restriction necessary to comply with the federal mandate.
Witnesses to your committee identified a number of issues with this 
exemption. Although drafted to recognize the supremacy of the 
federal government over state and local governments under the U.S. 
Constitution, this provision fails to take into account the complex 
interaction between federal and state regulation. For example, some 
federal regulations are not mandates per se, but guidelines that may 
be conditions to the state's receipt of federal funds. In other words, 
the federal government does not always impose a mandate, but may
reward the state if it adheres to certain regulations. It is not clear 
whether these regulations would be within the scope of the 
exemption.
On other issues where there is a federal mandate, there may be any
number of ways for state and local governments to comply with the 
mandate. Whether the particular method chosen is the minimum 




required will be subject to debate and will be an invitation to 
litigation, the outcome of which in any particular case is likely to be 
extremely uncertain. This will present a significant budgeting 
challenge to the governmental entity enforcing the federal 
regulation and may well exert a chilling effect on that governmental 
entity. That, in turn, may lead to assertions by federal regulators that
the state or local government is in violation of federal law.
In other words, this provision puts the entities charged with state
and local enforcement of federal laws in the difficult position of 
having to find the balance between complying with federal 
mandates without going "too far" and becoming vulnerable to a 
Measure 7 claim.
c. Restrictions on "Adult" Businesses. Although some of the "adult"
businesses identified in this exemption would already be exempted 
from compensation under the nuisance provisions, it appears that 
the intent of this section is to emphasize that the drafters of
Measure 7 did not want local governments to have to compensate 
property owners who operated certain businesses generally viewed 
as undesirable. It is interesting to note that the Millers and Bill 
Moshofsky of OIA told your committee that they themselves 
recognize situations where community interests justify regulation of 
private property without compensation.
Time Limits and Retroactivity. This provision was intended to          
implement a simple principle: that prospective property owners 
have a responsibility to research all the rules that apply to a property 
at the time of purchase and to live with those rules after the purchase.
Unfortunately, the wording selected appears to have the opposite
effect of that intended by the drafters. 
The difficulty is with the "first enforced or applied" language. A           
number of land use lawyers who appeared before your committee  
stated that this language means that a property owner would have a 
valid Measure 7 claim if the owner bought land when a particular 
restriction applied (e.g., a zoning ordinance) but the owner had not 
actually applied to use the property in the restricted way before 
Measure 7 was adopted. For example, a property owner in a
neighborhood zoned residential may never have applied for a permit
to operate a dry cleaning business. If that owner applies for a permit
after Measure 7 takes effect and the local government denies the
request based on the zoning ordinance, the owner would likely have a
valid Measure 7 claim because the zoning restriction is "first applied"
to that property owner after the effective date of Measure 7.
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This reading is supported by the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. 99-2047 (June 28, 2001), in which a 
majority of the justices ruled that landowners are not barred from 
bringing takings claims merely because a particular regulation was 
in effect prior to the time the landowner obtained title to the property. 
Moreover, according to the land use lawyers interviewed by your 
Committee, each separate request for a particular use could give rise 
to a Measure 7 claim. For example, if the current or prior owner's 
request to operate a dry cleaner had been denied previously, the 
current owner could nevertheless apply to operate a fast food 
restaurant or a convenience store.  
The provision stating that compensation is payable if the restriction 
"continues to apply" 90 days after the claim is filed was intended to 
give the rule-making entity time to rescind the rule or decision. The 
intent was to force quick adjudication of claims without a long, costly
process and to allow the governmental entity to avoid having to pay
compensation by simply waiving the restriction. There has been
significant debate regarding whether this provision actually authorizes
the entity to waive a regulation, since the measure does not specifically
authorize waiver.
3. Additional Interpretation Questions
Measure 7's supporters noted that the measure was designed to make
compensation an explicit right in the Oregon Constitution, while
leaving many details to be worked out by state and local agencies and
through litigation. Somewhat surprisingly, the supporters indicated
that they thought that resolution of uncertainties in the measure
through litigation was a positive aspect of the measure. They also
pointed out that a constitutional measure would be invalidated
outright for covering "multiple issues" if it had the detail and
completeness of comprehensive enabling legislation.
Some of the issues that need to be resolved include:
! Funding for payment of claims and allocation of the obligation 
among state and local regulating entities.
! The process for submitting, deciding, and appealing claims. 
! What government gets in return when it pays compensation. 
! The scope of Measure 7, including whether it applies to tax laws and
other laws that only indirectly affect real property (e.g., the Bottle 




Many local government officials warned that Measure 7 could be very
costly, difficult to administer, and detrimental to Oregon's land use
planning system. Most local jurisdictions passed ordinances to
implement Measure 7, setting out the process and rules for filing
compensation claims.
Concurrently, the League of Oregon Cities, Multnomah County, the
City of Beaverton and other entities and individuals joined in the
consolidation of suits originally filed by Audrey McCall (wife of former
Governor Tom McCall), Hector McPherson (the "father" of 1973 Senate
Bill 100) and others challenging Measure 7. They alleged violations of
the laws governing citizen initiatives that require the ballot measure to
address only one subject and to include the full text of the portion of
the Oregon Constitution to be amended. Judge Paul Lipscomb of
Marion County Circuit Court granted a temporary stay pending full
review of the matter on December 6, 2000 (one day before the effective
date of Measure 7). On February 22, 2001, Judge Lipscomb granted a
permanent stay against the enforcement of Measure 7.
Meanwhile, the legislature had taken notice of both Measure 7's
passage and the apparent legal issues involved. Oregon House Speaker
Mark Simmons (R-Elgin) issued a set of principles to guide the
response to Measure 7. He also called for a process that would develop
legislation that would respond to the perceived wishes of the voters
with a workable compensation plan. Senate President Gene Derfler (R-
Salem) chose not to take action, but the House did.
The first step in that process was to form a standing committee, the
Land Use and Regulatory Fairness (LURF) committee, on February 23,
2001. The LURF committee was chaired by Rep. Max Williams (R-
Tigard). Rep. Kurt Schrader (D-Canby) was vice-chair.
The LURF Committee held public hearings on a weekly basis, later
going to two sessions per week until further hearings were canceled in
late June. LURF drafted a bill, HB 3998, to provide a document for
substantive discussion. In combination with a draft Joint Resolution,
HB 3998 would have repealed Measure 7 and replaced it with a
statutory compensation scheme. The bill sought to provide
clarification of circumstances under which a landowner would be
eligible for compensation and how that process would be handled.
Subsequently, fourteen amendments to the bill were made in
committee, but discussions stumbled primarily on the issue of funding
(the same issue that stymied similar discussion in the 1970s and
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1980s). When the legislature adjourned on July 7, HB 3998 died in
committee. Rep. Williams, chair of LURF, indicated that the underlying
difficulty preventing resolution in the 2001 Legislative Session was an
unwillingness of any of the special interest groups to compromise or
move from their basic positions.
The Governor's participation in the debate over HB 3998 can best be
described as dispassionate, as he seemed to view other pending issues
as having higher priority. He made two brief appearances before the
committee but did not publicly encourage the work of the LURF
committee.
At the conclusion of the regular session of the Legislature, consensus
from nearly all quarters, both on and off LURF, was that this issue was
one that would have to be resolved in a special session of the
Legislature. A special session is likely to be called should the Oregon
Supreme Court reverse the lower Court's finding and rule that Measure
7 is valid. Such a ruling would apparently create a fiscal and land use
planning crisis. Sources close to the litigation speculate that a ruling
could come as late as mid-2002. 
Until the Supreme Court rules, Measure 7 is in limbo. 
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MEASURE 7
A.   Arguments For Measure 7
Proponents of Measure 7 advanced the following arguments in support
of the measure:
! Any restriction of use and value of land should be compensated as a 
matter of fairness.
! Making government consider the economic effects of its regulations 
brings accountability and responsibility to government action. Lack 
of compensation creates "great danger of excessive regulation."
! The burden of providing public benefits should be borne by all 
taxpayers, rather than on a small group of unfortunate property 
owners.
! Government can avoid large fiscal impact by not adopting 
regulations that would require compensation.
B.   Arguments Against Measure 7
Opponents of Measure 7 advanced the following arguments against
the measure: 
Measure 7:
! would create lots of potentially costly litigation.
! may apply to land purchased after a law or regulation was adopted, 
even though any impact of such law/regulation on the property 
value should already be reflected in the sale price (i.e., there's no 
loss to the purchaser).
! does not offer a baseline property value provision, so a jury hearing 
a claim is without guidance about how to evaluate loss.
! has significant cost implications but does not provide a funding or 
payment mechanism.
! does not address owner's intended use of property that is subject to 
regulation. Thus, a property owner could seek compensation even if 
regulation did not affect that owner's intended use of his land.
! lacks a mechanism for taking into account the general benefits of 
zoning and other regulations that on balance increase the value of 
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property, i.e., the aggregate increase in property values due to 
zoning does not factor into the "loss" experienced by any particular 
property owner due to zoning restrictions.
! Government could hardly continue if it had to compensate for every
reduction in value caused by regulations.
! Common law nuisance is too abstract and narrow a concept on 




Following our study of the background to Measure 7 and analysis of
the arguments for and against it, discussed in preceding sections, your
Committee explored:
! What is the problem that needs to be solved in Oregon, which led to 
Measure 7?
! What are the elements of a framework for land use and regulatory 
fairness, which would need to underlie or follow an initiative like 
Measure 7?
! What broad conception of property rights and associated principles 
should guide the development of "son of 7" solutions?
A synthesis of our discussion follows.
A.   What Is The Problem That Needs To Be Solved In Oregon?
Although Measure 7, on its face, addressed the issue of compensation
for reductions in property value caused by regulations, it tapped into a
range of concerns and frustrations. Witnesses to your Committee
identified the following catalysts for the passage of Measure 7:
1. Unequal and perceived arbitrary effect of land use regulations 
on different property owners. 
2. Disagreement on values with respect to the goals of land use
regulation (e.g., some people believe that protection of        
endangered species justifies uncompensated restrictions on 
use of land, while others believe that such restrictions are 
either unjustified or must be compensated.) 
3. Divergent views about which public goals are appropriate to 
pursue via land use regulation, as opposed to other means 
(e.g., some people think land use regulation should be used to 
protect open spaces and other people think open spaces for 
public benefit should be purchased). 
4. Questions about the scientific justification for certain 
environmental regulations (e.g., whether stream buffers along 
the Willamette River in downtown Portland or grazing 
restrictions in sparsely populated areas of Eastern Oregon 
really help salmon). 
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5. Heightened sensitivity about private property rights because of
the potent symbolism pertaining to private property in our 
culture. 
6. Frustration with regulatory processes that are complex, 
burdensome, uncertain, costly, and/or impractical, whether 
based on personal experience, anecdotal evidence, or urban 
legends. 
B.   Analysis of Elements of a Framework for Land Use and 
Regulatory Fairness
In the course of its discussions regarding Measure 7, your committee
determined that the proponents of Measure 7 underestimated the
complexity of the issues involving compensation for regulatory
takings, or, if they did understand the complexity, they downplayed it
during the election campaign. Your committee identified at least 17
separate but interdependent factors that should be considered in
evaluating or developing a compensation system. While a complete
analysis of all of these factors could fill many volumes and therefore is
beyond the scope of this report, a flavor of the complexity attendant to
each of them is provided by the following discussion.
1. Type of Landowner Entitled to Compensation
The starting point for analysis of a compensation scheme is whether
certain types of landowners should be excepted from compensation.
We heard from the drafters of Measure 7 that their primary focus
seemed to be on individual landowners—such as themselves—who
wanted to build a primary residence on a single residential lot in an
already developed area. Certainly, this type of landowner was the pri-
mary focus of the advertising campaign in favor of Measure 7. 
However, philosophically, your committee also considered that all
citizens (broadly read to include corporations and other entities) are
entitled to equal protection under the law and identified some
situations where limiting relief to individual landowners would not
alleviate the perceived inequities that animated the Measure 7
proponents. For example, your committee heard from individuals who
testified that they had purchased land for investment purposes at a
time when the property was clearly zoned to allow two-acre home
sites. These owners told the committee that, shortly after the purchase,
the land was down-zoned to exclusive farm use, effectively prohibiting
the construction of any homes on the property. (See Appendix G for
more background on this situation.) If one accepts that these
individuals suffered a loss when the rules changed after they had made
their investment, their loss is arguably as great (and greater in terms of




Your committee also considered whether governmental property
owners should be eligible for compensation where, for example, a
separate governmental entity imposed a restriction on the use of
property. On the one hand, compensation in this situation is
consistent with the principle that one level of government should not
be able to impose unfunded mandates on a lower level of government,
a principle that seems popular with Oregon voters. Also, allowing
compensation for government owners protects the taxpayers within
the boundaries of the aggrieved entity from impositions by a different
governmental entity that may not be as concerned about the fiscal
impact on a discrete minority. (For example, the state government may
impose a burden on a single city, realizing that the sheer numbers of
the statewide population would dilute a revolt of the citizens of the
single city). Viewed in this light, government-to-government
compensation is merely a subset of the broader principle Measure 7
supporters argue that they are supporting-protection of individuals
against the tyranny of the majority. 
On the other hand, your committee was concerned that including
governments in the group of eligible property owners might stretch to
the breaking point already limited funds available for Measure 7 type
claims. Your committee also questioned whether government-to-
government mandates are really part of the problem voters thought
they were addressing when they voted for Measure 7. Finally, your
committee considered that it might be appropriate to exclude
governmental property owners from compensation because they,
unlike private owners, do not pay property tax on their holdings. 
2. Type of Property
Your committee considered whether it is appropriate to treat certain
types of land differently for purposes of compensation claims. We
identified at least six different types of property that raise different
concerns: rural lands, urban lands (within or just outside an urban
growth boundary), coastal lands, Willamette Valley lands versus other
parts of Oregon, developed land versus undeveloped land, and
farm/forest land. 
We noted that each of these types of lands faces specific development
pressures and carrying limits, certain historical and evolving uses, and
certain emotional or subjective values to the people of Oregon. A
compensation scheme could establish different rules depending on
these factors, but the increase in complexity may outweigh the
benefits of targeted provisions. Ultimately, these considerations likely
need to be weighed on a case-by-case basis. 
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3. Triggering Event for A Claim
In this category, your committee considered when a reduction in value
would be considered concrete enough to give rise to a claim for
compensation. For example, we considered that any of the following
events might demonstrate sufficient evidence of a loss:
! actual sale of property below its expected value without the land use
restriction;
! drop in assessed or appraised value without actual sale;
! loss of future revenue stream from lost investment opportunity;
! cost of compliance with regulations; and
! temporary loss of use of property (e.g., property zoned exclusive 
farm use but eventually brought within urban growth boundary).
Our appraiser witnesses testified that these events are themselves
interrelated because the value of residential rental property,
commercial property, and industrial property is determined in part by
the expected revenue stream from the revenue-generating activities
conducted on the property.
Your committee considered the idea of requiring an actual sale of the
property to give rise to a compensation right. Arguments in favor of
this requirement include: 
! an element of speculation and subjectivity is removed because one 
variable in the compensation equation (the value of the land with 
the land use restriction) becomes fixed;
! windfalls will be reduced because the property owner would not be 
able to treat the compensation system like a lottery on the theory 
that even if they did not obtain compensation, they still would have 
the property;
! similar to the preceding bullet, the property owner would not get the
value of the proposed use without the investment of time, energy or 
risk (e.g., without a sale requirement, if the owner could obtain 
compensation based on denial of permission to build a fast-food 
restaurant, why take the risk of actually building the restaurant?);
! assuming that a willing buyer exists who can accept the restrictions 
on the property, and the compensation allows the original owner to 
buy replacement property not subject to the same restriction, 




! the government should not be in the business of compensating 
unrealized losses—today's prohibited use may result in a higher 
value at a later date, in which case the owner would have received a 
true windfall;
! it is likely that the original flood of claims could be avoided due to 
the time needed to prepare the property for sale and market the 
property; and
! attempts to collude to set unrealistically low sales prices could be 
addressed by always giving the government a right of first refusal for 
property for which a compensation claim is made.
The sale requirement seems to work best in the commercial setting 
and not as well in the individual residence situation. For example, it 
seems unfair to force an individual who simply wants to build a single
house on the family farm to sell that property in order to get compen-
sation. Similarly, the sale requirement does not take fully into account
the fact that all real property has distinct characteristics and a use
restricted in one place (e.g., gold mining) may not be possible any
place else.
Moreover, testimony before your committee indicated that much of
the frustration motivating passage of Measure 7 was caused by
restrictions on putting land to a desired use. We heard from several
witnesses that they do not want a compensation "windfall," they
simply want to be able to use the land in a manner that was permitted
at the time they purchased it. A sale with compensation scheme would
not address this motivation for Measure 7.
4. Cause of Loss
The cause of a loss in property value is important in defining the limits
of a compensation scheme. We doubt that voters who supported
Measure 7 would approve of compensation for reductions in property
values regardless of cause or that they would endorse a government-
backed guarantee that property values would never decline under any
circumstances. As drafted, Measure 7 considers the cost of compliance
with many environmental regulations as a reduction in property value.
We suspect that many voters would find this provision problematic, at
least in isolation. Another philosophical question is whether losses
caused by any government action (e.g., OSHA requirements, minimum
wage, etc.) should be compensated, or just losses caused by direct land
use regulations.  
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Virtually all of the people your Committee talked to about Measure 7
said they believe the measure was intended to provide compensation
for losses caused by land use regulations and not laws that do not
directly regulate land use (e.g., the Bottle Bill, which indirectly requires
a certain portion of some retail businesses to set aside property for
processing returned beverage containers). Compensation for losses
caused by actions of other private property owners is clearly is not a
public responsibility and thus appears to be beyond the scope of
Measure 7 itself. 
5. Timing of Loss
A date would have to be selected that would establish a baseline of
regulations that, although they caused declines in some property
values, would not be compensable. The authors of Measure 7 intended
some degree of retroactive compensation, at least to protect property
owners from regulatory changes that occurred after they bought
property that they currently own. Retroactive compensation could be
difficult to define and apply because it is not always clear when
particular past regulations first applied to a property. Also, retroactivity
would likely increase the fiscal impact of a compensation scheme
significantly. Finally, it may not be fair to current taxpayers to award
compensation for past regulations based on standards that did not
exist when the regulations were adopted. 
However, a compensation system that does not allow retroactive
compensation would not address the concerns of a Oregon property
owners whose property was affected by past regulations and the
original implementation of Oregon's land use planning system.
6. Loss Threshold For Triggering Compensation
Establishing a loss threshold removes from the compensation system
claims for reductions in value that are incidental to the functions of
government. This is consistent with the much-quoted statement that
government could not go on if every single reduction in value had to
be compensated. Some costs are simply the consequence of living in a
complex society. Loss thresholds, such as the following, could be
considered: 
! A percentage reduction in the total value of the property (e.g. greater
than 25 percent). This would exclude losses that are small relative to 
the value of the property itself. Moreover, appraisals tend to vary 
from one appraiser to another for the same property, so setting a 
percentage reduction trigger would exclude losses that are 
essentially within the "margin of error" of appraisals.  
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! A minimum dollar amount of loss (e.g., $10,000). This type of trigger 
would ensure that claims are submitted only for losses that exceed 
the cost to process the claim.
7. Limits On Amount of Compensation
Compensation could have a very big fiscal impact on state and local
governments in Oregon depending on how it is structured. One way to
limit this liability is to have some kind of cap on compensation. This
could be a simple maximum dollar amount for any given claim, a
maximum number of claims, or some combination of these two (e.g., a
maximum number of claims, or maximum amount, whichever occurs
first). 
8. Time Limit for Filing a Compensation Claim
It is common for claims systems to have time limits for filing a claim.
Time limits are normally imposed to ensure the availability of
information for deciding a claim, to allow "peace of mind" after a
certain period of time has passed after a potential liability-triggering
event, and to provide government agencies with quick feedback on
policies or actions that give rise to claims.
The framework for time limits on land use compensation claims needs
to be based on the dates of one or more of the following actions:
! Adoption of the compensation system.
! Beginning of the functioning of the compensation system.
! Acquisition of real property by the landowner.
! Adoption of a regulation by a government entity.
! Application of regulation to a property.
! Enforcement of regulation with respect to a property.
! Sale or other disposition of property by the landowner.
! Timing of other remedies sought by the landowner prior to the 
request for compensation.
The framers of Measure 7 contemplated compensation for rules and
regulations adopted, applied, or enforced after a property owner
purchased a property, but set no time limit for filing a claim after one
of the triggering events. Also, nothing in the language of Measure 7
specifically limits its provisions to triggering events that occur after the
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enactment of Measure 7. Nor is it clear from the language of Measure 7
whether a property owner necessarily must still own the property to
have a right to file a claim, or whether a current property owner can
file a claim for triggering events that occurred under previous owners
These questions are particularly relevant after the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, which at least suggests
that former owners may have standing to bring takings claims in some
circumstances.
A number of landowners your committee interviewed regarded
compensation as a last resort. They expressed a preference for
pursuing appeals within the current land use system to gain a
favorable change in the application or interpretation of the effective
regulations. Since the appeals process can take a decade or more, a
relatively short time limit on claims would tend to force compensation
claims instead of land use appeals.
Likewise, many of the current cases that provided impetus for Measure
7 started with land use decisions over twenty years ago. While a
shorter time limit for filing might be appropriate once a compensation
system has been functioning for a number of years, consideration has
to be given to existing cases subject to lengthy appeals and for which
no clear compensation mechanism was previously available.
Another argument for setting a shorter time period addresses the
problem of determining "loss in real property value." Property
valuations are necessarily subjective, and it may be difficult to estimate
changes in property valuation at the time decisions were made ten or
twenty years earlier.
9. What to Submit to File Claim
At the heart of any compensation system is the need to justify claims
with objective evidence of losses for which compensation is to be paid.
Any system for land use claims would have to address the following
basic elements for a submittal:
! Standard form to identify the claimant, the basic elements of the 
claim, and compliance with time limits and other requirements.
! Payment of an application fee.
! Proof of ownership of the property involved during the relevant 
period.
! Documentation of the adoption, application, and/or enforcement of
relevant regulations.




The question of "burden of proof" needs to be carefully defined in any
claims system. In most civil cases, the burden of proof falls on the
plaintiff, with the standard being "preponderance of the evidence."
Given the significant public policy considerations implicated by land
use regulations, it may be appropriate to set a higher standard of proof
for compensation claims, such as "clear and convincing" evidence of a
decline in property value. 
10. Who Decides the Claim
Your committee agreed that, as a practical matter, claims typically will
be decided through some form of adverse system as opposed to
mediation. Mediation is only practical when all parties are willing to
give up something to get to a resolution. Claims could be adjudicated
by existing entities or new ones. A board of appraisers would likely
have to determine the dollar amount of loss. This board could be made
up of private appraisers, government tax assessors, or both. The entity
deciding claims should:
! Have the appropriate knowledge and authority to be respected by all
parties to a claim.
! Be able to evaluate the local details of a specific claim within the 
context of a statewide compensation framework.
! Adjudicate claims consistently.
! Be free of real or perceived conflicts of interest in the decision. 
11. Time Limit for Decision
A key feature of Measure 7 is the establishment of a 90-day deadline
for either payment of a claim or rescission of the regulation that gave
rise to the claim. Historically, land use appeals can be a lengthy
process, and the courts can take years to resolve all the appeal issues.
Finding a way to expedite this process is in everyone's interest, as long
as the quality of decisions does not suffer. Changes in land use policy
are difficult to consider and implement in a short time period. As we
have demonstrated, the issues involved in compensation claims are
likely to be complex and multi-faceted. Instead of a 90-day limit, the
American Planning Association (APA) recommends a period of 150
days to parallel the limits currently applied to LUBA appeals. Any final
rules on time limits would have to take into account the time needed
for orderly decision-making processes without stalling delays.
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12. Forms of Compensation
Measure 7 does not specify the form compensation should take.
Several alternatives could be envisioned, and combinations of these.
Forms of compensation could include:
! Cash or check. This could include a lump sum or payment in 
installments (following a predetermined timeframe and payment 
stream).
! Tax reduction or abatement. This could entail a reduction or waiver 
of property and/or income tax in the current and/or future years, 
until the specified compensation level is reached or agreed time
frame is met. Should reimbursement be delayed into future years, 
guidelines would be required.
! Government purchases property. This course would be more suited 
to certain types of claims than others. For example, this would be 
advisable in cases where property is stripped of all or most private 
value; rather than compensate the property owner for the loss, it 
would be appropriate to compensate the owner by purchasing the 
property at "fair" pre-regulation market value. 
! Government trades property for property. The government could 
provide a parcel of equally valued land to the property owner, and 
take ownership of the property under claim. This presents 
challenges, as each piece of real estate has unique attributes that 
add and/or detract from the value, in the eyes of the owner. This 
option would be advisable in those cases where it is in the 
government's interest to own the land under claim, or where the 
government can provide comparable land to the owner, without 
forfeiting valued or potentially valuable public land.
! Government grants easement. This alternative would enable the 
property owner to gain access to government-owned property. This 
would be more suited to certain types of claims and property 
situations. For example, an owner whose property adjoins public 
land might be granted an easement to make specific uses of that 
land, as compensation for the loss associated with regulatory 
restrictions.
! Government grants density bonus. In this alternative, the 
government could provide the owner with a density bonus, thereby 
adding new value to the property as compensation for the loss. For 
example, an owner of residential property who is prohibited from 
building within a stream buffer zone, due to an environmental 
overlay, could be granted a density bonus that would enable 
conversion of the lot from single-family to duplex. Such bonuses 
would need to be carefully administered in light of neighborhood 




13. Alternatives to Compensation
! Government grants waiver to regulation. There may be cases in 
which waiving the regulation for a specific claimant or group of 
claimants may be a best solution. This would not mean revoking the
regulation, but merely setting it aside under specific cases in which 
the regulation is viewed as inordinately unfair. The granting of 
waivers would need to be systematically controlled, to prevent 
abuse and to ensure consistency across locations and over time.
! Government rescinds regulation.
14. Right Purchased by Government
Measure 7 is silent on the issue of what regulating agencies receive in
exchange for the payment of compensation to property owners. In
more traditional takings cases, there are a number of vehicles for
defining and recording the government interest in a "taken" property:
! Simple title: the government agency becomes the owner of the 
property. The agency may subsequently develop the property, deed 
it to another entity, or sell it.
! Easement: the government agency acquires access or other 
occupation rights to selective use of the property. Easement rights 
are recorded and are retained by the government agency even if the 
underlying private property is sold to another owner. In turn, the 
easement rights may be sold or returned to the property owner for 
appropriate consideration.
! Other rights: mineral rights, air rights, water rights, and 
development rights are examples of other rights that may be 
acquired and documented in exchange for compensation.
A compensation system for changes in land use regulations needs to
consider three key attributes of the rights that the government is
acquiring in exchange for compensation:
! Enforceability: the acquired rights have to be documented and 
recorded as rights that run with the land.
! Flexibility: the rights acquired should parallel the rights inherent in 
the loss for which compensation is being paid. For example, 
compensation for land designated to remain as open space should 
be paid in exchange for development rights. Similarly, rights and 
compensation for a regulation that has a finite life (such as Urban 
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Growth Boundary limits) should be structured to recognize the       
temporary nature of the restriction.
! Reversible: the government entity owning the rights should be able 
to sell them back to the property owner or to other government 
entities as circumstances or policies change.
15. Who Pays?
Ultimately, the costs of a compensation scheme would be borne by the
public. However, costs might be shouldered through various
intermediate means. Your committee considered what public entity
should pay for compensation claims. Three broad alternatives
emerged:
! The entity that mandates lower levels of government to institute a 
regulation should pay. Typically, this would entail a federal or state 
agency (with minimal likelihood of federally-sponsored 
compensation). 
! The entity that passes the regulation should pay. This would entail 
local, county or state government.
! An independent fund dedicated to cover compensation claims.
! The entity responsible for paying compensation claims could face 
serious financial hardship, if funding is not earmarked and available 
to meet revenue requirements. In addition, this entity is likely to be 
quite vigilant of any new regulations that have a potential to 
generate claims. 
16. Funding for Compensation
Your committee did not analyze the potential financial implications of
Measure 7. In our deliberations, we assumed that the extent of annual
claims could be anywhere from $150 million (as asserted by OIA) to
$5.4 billion (as stated in the Measure 7 “estimate of financial impact”
in the Voters' Pamphlet). Clearly revenue requirements are an essential
area of analysis, covering the magnitude of requirements in the short-
and long-term in association with assorted existing and prospective
regulations.
Revenue requirements will drive the determination of the appropriate
source or sources of funding for a compensation program. Several
alternatives could be developed to fund compensation for regulatory
takings. Your committee considered criteria that could be used to
evaluate sources of funding, and considered funding alternatives.










! Ease of implementation and administration
Some of these criteria are not straightforward. For example, would an
equitable funding mechanism be one that links costs to the
beneficiaries of the regulation(s), to the beneficiaries of development,
or to some other measure? Clearly, alternatives would require careful
analysis, before moving forward. Given this caveat, a preliminary list of
funding alternatives could include, but need not be limited to the
following. Multiple sources of funding could be tapped.
! Redirection of existing funding. This would entail reducing or 
eliminating funding of other programs—changing government 
priorities—to free up resources to fund compensation claims. The 
General Fund would be a potential source of such funding. 
! Creation of new or modified taxes. A new tax could be established 
or an existing tax modified to generate more revenue. Examples 
include:
Real estate transfer tax. This tax is levied at the time of transfer
of real property, and is paid by the buyer. Such taxes may be 
based on a percentage of assessed value, a flat deed 
registration fee, or both.
Early property tax discount. The state could reduce or 
eliminate the current discount of three percent for early 
payment of property taxes, and earmark the savings to fund 
compensation.
Tax on increases in property value. This tax, like a capital gains
tax, would be triggered by increases in market value of 
property. This tax would be similar to a property tax but might 
provide for a higher tax rate on the incremental increase in 
value than on the "base" value. A cap could be set on 
maximum gains to be taxed. 
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Tax on exception value. This tax would be triggered when a 
property owner files for a permit to partition, subdivide or 
rezone property for development or improvements.
Sales tax. A state and/or local tax on the sale of goods and 
services could be established to fund compensation.
Tax on professional or other group. This could entail taxing 
professional groups that benefit from the costs associated with
development-related regulation (such as architects, 
engineering firms, and land use attorneys' fees), or taxing 
groups that impact upon development (such as new residents 
to the state).
Excise taxes. These are taxes on specific goods or services, such
as lodging, food/beverages, cigarettes, alcohol, automobiles, 
gasoline, parking spaces (or real estate transfer, or tax on a 
professional group). Funds generated from excise taxes are 
typically limited to specific related uses.
! Other new sources of funding. Other new sources of funding also 
might be considered, including:
Profits from state-managed gambling. Revenue could be 
generated by expanding the Oregon lottery, introducing slot 
machines, or establishing other state-run gambling. 
Federal funding. Federal funding may be available to support 
specific regulatory efforts, such as environmental protection, 
freeing up funds in current budgets for compensation. Federal 
funding is unlikely to support compensation directly. 
Sale of public land. While probably not a desirable solution, 
selling public land could generate funds to support a 
compensation program. This option would be more suitable 
when funds would be used to purchase land following a claim. 
17. Level of Compensation
Your committee considered various alternatives in terms of the level of
compensation that should be awarded to any given claimant, in
relation to his/her loss. Four broad categories emerged:
! Compensate the full loss.
! Compensate a designated percentage of the loss. 




! Compensate a designated percentage of the loss, up to a maximum
of some predetermined dollar amount.
Placing a cap on compensation might be considered unfair to owners
of large or valuable property. In addition, it might discourage large-
scale speculation on property. However, a cap could alleviate the
government's risk of extremely large claims. It addition, it would
protect smaller-scale property owners against losses. Compensating a
percentage of the loss would provide another means of sharing the loss
between government and property owner. The percentage could be set
at any designated level. Small- and large-scale property owners would
be treated the same. Alternatively, a tiered system could be developed,
in which property owners would receive different percentages in
compensation, based on the value of the loss.
Compensation could have a very big fiscal impact on state and local
governments in Oregon, depending on how it is structured. In addition
to considering a maximum dollar amount for any given claim, a cap
also could be placed on the number of claims that would be awarded
during a given timeframe or in association with a particular regulation
(meaning that not all property owners would be treated equally).
Another option might be to establish a limited pool for compensation
during a specified period of time (such as one to five years), and
provide payment until that pool is exhausted.
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V. CONCLUSIONS: PROPERTY RIGHTS
PHILOSOPHY AND PRINCIPLES FOR “SON OF
7” SOLUTIONS
At the beginning of this report, we noted that there is a spectrum of
opinions regarding the proper balance between private property rights
and community interests. We believe it is possible to find a rough
consensus among citizens as to the place on the spectrum where
rights are appropriately balanced against community interests that
justify restrictions on the use of property. We further believe that it is
imperative that Oregonians try to find that consensus.
Concerns and frustrations over the impact of Oregon's land use laws
on individual property owners have been simmering for 25 years. The
legislature has not been able to provide a meaningful solution for three
main reasons. First, it has been difficult to identify a consensus on
where the line should be drawn on regulatory takings. Second, there
has been no real impetus to change the status quo. Third, there has
been a lack of political will to find the money to fund compensation
for disproportionately affected landowners. The success of Measure 7
has forced the hand of policy makers, and we urge the legislature to
take a proactive approach to finding a palatable alternative to
Measure 7.
Measure 7 is not the answer to Oregon's regulatory takings problem.
We believe that Measure 7 itself has grave flaws, both in procedure and
in substance. In the hands of skilled lawyers, it likely would go far
beyond even the ambitious stated goals of its drafters. Yet, we
acknowledge that Measure 7 resonated with many voters because
there are examples of inequities and defeated expectations that should
be remedied. We do not think the campaigns adequately explained the
ramifications of Measure 7. The implications of Measure 7 on the land
use system, which we believe most Oregonians support, must be
communicated to Oregonians.
In fact, we believe that the vast majority of Oregonians find themselves
somewhere in the middle of the property rights spectrum. Property
rights advocates may have to accept the fact that most Oregonians
appear to favor most zoning restrictions, just as advocates for more
extensive land use restrictions may have to accept that most
Oregonians seem to favor the right of an individual to build at least a
single family residence on land he or she owns. Similarly, advocates of
restrictions must realize that broad-brush solutions often impose
disproportionate impacts on some individuals, while property rights
advocates must realize that Oregon's increasing population threatens




Principles: In the course of our work, we learned that the issues
surrounding compensation for governmental restrictions on the use of
property are extremely complex. We developed a set of principles that
we believe should guide any debate over compensation for land use
regulations and any legislative or initiative response to Measure 7. The
principles include the following:
1. Real property is a finite resource that is subject to increasing 
pressures due to population growth. Society has a strong 
interest in protecting and regulating the use of this resource.
2. Although Oregon's current land use system may not be 
perfect, it is a legitimate and successful tool for 
accomplishing many goals that are in the public's interest.
3. The current constitutional and statutory framework of land 
use planning in some cases puts unfair burdens on certain 
landowners, and those burdens should be compensated.  
Government regulations can cause a loss in the value of private
property that, in some cases, should be compensated.
4. The definition of a takings needs to be refined to set definite 
parameters on the scope of compensable takings caused by 
land use regulations. 
5. Compensation should not be paid for alleged reductions in 
value resulting from regulations abating nuisances. The 
definition of a "nuisance" needs to be clarified and updated 
periodically to reflect evolving scientific knowledge, the 
cumulative impact of individual land use decisions, and 
community values. 
6. Any compensation system should be codified in statutes rather
than the Oregon Constitution and should emphasize certainty 
and stability.
7. If the government is required to pay compensation to a 
property owner, the government should acquire an 
enforceable property-related right. The government's right 
should be transferable. Subsequent property owners should 
take ownership of the land subject to the government's 
acquired right to restrict use of the property without further 
compensation.
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8. The government should have options in terms of the form of 
compensation (such as tax abatements and property swaps, 
among others). These should include the option to sell back 
the right to engage in the restricted use at a later date. 
9. Only losses of value above a certain threshold should be 
eligible for compensation.
10. The government should not guarantee unreasonable 
expectations of profit. Expectations are more likely to be 
reasonable if they involve continuation of a historic use or a 
use that was expressly permitted (e.g., under zoning laws) at 
the time the owner acquired the property. Speculation (e.g., of 
the assumed right to build a subdivision on farmland) should 
not be compensated.  
11. The compensation scheme should set a date that establishes 
the baseline of regulations or restrictions that will not be 
compensable. 
12. There should be a statute of limitations on submitting claims.
13. If an alternative to Measure 7 is presented to voters, it should 
include not only the compensation scheme, but also the corre
sponding funding mechanism.
14. Compensation for losses by regulatory takings should be 
funded, to the extent practicable, by revenue generated from 
property owners who benefit from changes in land use 
regulation. This inverse corollary to takings compensation 
should be assessed upon the property owners' realization of 
profits. 
15. In reviewing specific proposed land use regulations, regulators 
should be required to take into account the burden on private 
landowners (such as in a fiscal impact statement) versus the 
benefits to the public from the regulations and the amount of 
likely regulatory takings claims that will result.
Making land use planning work for positive purposes while mitigating
negative side effects is a very challenging and critically important
undertaking. Oregon has wrestled with this dilemma since the state's
land use system was created in 1973. Regardless of how the Oregon
Supreme Court rules on Measure 7, the issue is not going away. Your
committee thinks the time is right to take a comprehensive look at the
issue of compensation for regulatory takings. Any relief should be
narrowly tailored to cases of truly unfair hardships, taking into account




1. Adopt Principles: The City Club should formally and
individually adopt each of the 15 principles. The Club should 
use these principles to evaluate any future proposals for a 
system of compensation for the impact of government 
regulations on property values. 
2. Identify Appropriate Balance: The governor and Oregon 
Legislative Assembly should immediately begin a public 
process that will identify the appropriate balance between 
property rights and community interests that is acceptable to, 
and will be supported by, the majority of Oregonians.
3. Develop and Implement Limited Compensation Program:
The governor and Oregon Legislative Assembly should use the 
input from the public process and work with interested and 
affected parties to craft and implement a statutory 
compensation program that follows the principles that we 
have laid out.
4. Eliminate Measure 7 language from the Oregon Constitution:
If the Oregon Supreme Court upholds Measure 7, the Oregon 
Legislative Assembly should refer to voters a measure to 












Mark Anderson, research advisor
Paul Leistner, research director
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VII. APPENDICES
A.   Glossary of Terms
Chilling Effect: The result in which legislatures or other regulatory
agencies are inhibited in the creation or implementation of new regu-
lations because of potential fiscal implications of the new rules, many
of which are difficult to anticipate. There can be a chilling effect on
new regulations even if compensation is likely not payable because of
the costs of litigation to prove the case. The quandary is exacerbated
by the fact that typically no state or local funding is available for com-
pensation.
Community Plans: Under Oregon system, plans which provide specific
land use designations on property within the unincorporated urban
area of a county and also provide detailed policy direction to guide
development based on community needs and desires.
Condemnation: The taking of private property for public use, subject
to laws of just compensation.
Density: A measurement of the number of people or dwelling units in
relationship to a specified amount of land, for example, the number of
dwelling units per gross acre. Density is a measurement used generally
for residential uses, and does not include land devoted to streets.
DLCD: Department of Land Conservation and Development.
Administrative (staff) arm of LCDC.
Easement: A non-ownership right held by a person, or the public, to
use the land of another.
EFU: Land use planning designation for Exclusive Farm Use; alt:
Exclusive Forestry Use; Usually referring to land originally designated
with special provisions under SB100.
Eminent Domain: The power to take private property for public use by
the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations author-
ized to exercise functions of public character. The owner's lack of con-
sent is immaterial. However, The Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, and Oregon's Constitution, require just compensation be
made whenever private property is taken for public use. The process of
eminent domain is commonly referred to as "condemnation" or
"expropriation".
Investment backed expectations: The purchase price (i.e., the "invest-
ment") as a measure of the buyer's reasonable expectations with
respect to permissible (at time of purchase) uses of the property. 
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LCDC: Seven member citizen commission, gubernatorial appointees
confirmed by Senate, representing a population/regional formula pre-
scribed by law. LCDC is "acknowledging" body for community plans
and considers requests of local land use appeals to LUBA.
LUBA: Land Use Board of Appeals. An independent special "court"
consisting of three referees appointed by the governor, confirmed by
the state senate. LUBA has jurisdiction over matters involving land use
and planning decisions made by local jurisdictions, hears appeals from
citizens and DLCD. Appeals from LUBA go straight to Oregon Court of
Appeals, then to Oregon Supreme Court.
LURF: House Standing Committee on Land Use and Regulatory
Fairness, appointed by Speaker during the last general Session to deal
with impact of Ballot Measure 7.
METRO: Officially designated regional land use planning authority for
Washington, Multnomah and Clackamas Counties, with responsibili-
ties to LCDC analogous to those of the other 33 counties.
Nonconforming Use: A use that was allowed by right when established
or a use that obtained a required land use approval when established,
but that subsequently, because of a change in the zone or zoning regu-
lations, is now prohibited in the zone. 
Nuisance: Anything which annoys or disturbs the free use of one's
property, or which renders ordinary use or physical occupation
uncomfortable, or which causes inconvenience or damage to another's
property. It includes acts or uses that endanger life or health, give
offense to the senses, violate the laws of decency, or obstruct the rea-
sonable and comfortable use of property. 
! A "Public Nuisance" is an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public or behavior that unreasonably 
interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of 
the general community.
! A "Private Nuisance" is an actionable interference with one's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of one's land.
Overlay District: A supplementary district placing special restrictions
or allowing special uses of land beyond those required or allowed.
! Environmental Overlay (example): A district created that imposes
specific local compliance requirement to achieve broader public 
environmental goals.
Real Property: Land, and generally whatever is erected or growing
upon or affixed to land. Also rights issuing out of, annexed to, and
exercisable within or about land. 
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Right-of-Way: A public or private area that allows for the passage of
people or goods. Right-of-way includes passageways such as freeways,
streets, bike paths, alleys, and walkways. A public right-of-way is a
right-of-way that is dedicated or deeded to the public use and under
the control of a public agency.
Rural Area: The land area located outside an acknowledged Urban
Growth Boundary.
SB100: Senate Bill 100 established statewide land use planning system
in 1973. It is still considered landmark legislation for Oregon as well as
a model many other states examined. 
SB849: Senate Bill 849 was a companion bill to SB100. Established the
principle of compensating landowners hurt by regulatory decisions;
however, no funding was provided, consequently it became a law with-
out teeth, and could not be implemented.
"Taking" or Takings": A finding that the government has appropriated
a property owner's land to such an extent that compensation is
payable.
UGB: Urban Growth Boundary; Legally defined line, approved by
LCDC, describing limits of expected residential, industrial and com-
mercial growth, often including unincorporated land, beyond which
city services, such as water and sewer will not be extended. Farming,
forestry or low density residential use is typical beyond those bound-
aries. UGB can be extended by cities subject to meeting criteria for
state planning goals (see Appendix E).
Urban Reserve: A 20-year land supply of land adjacent to UGB and
intended for urban development.
Windfalls and wipeouts: (Vernacular) Results caused by land use plan-
ning decisions, the inference being that one extreme or other are
potential for land owner.
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B.   Witness List
Clark Balfour, land use attorney, Cable Houston Benedict, et al.
Rep. Phillip Barnhart, D-Eugene
Dick Benner, director, Land Conservation and Development Commission
Chuck Bolsinger, property owner
David Bragdon, presiding officer, Metro
Alan Brickley, vice president and legal counsel, Key Title Company
Larry Campbell, chairman, Victory Group, Inc.
Phil Chadsey, legal counsel, Boise Cascade
Dorothy Cofield, land use attorney
Arnold Cogan, principal and land use planner, Cogan Owens Cogan
Steve Cornacchia, land use attorney, and former commissioner, Lane County 
Barton DeLacey, appraiser, Arthur Andersen
Sen. Gene Derfler, president, Oregon State Senate 
Jill Gelineau, land use attorney, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt
Virginia Gustafson Lucker, legislative counsel, Land Use and Regulatory  
Fairness Committee, Oregon House of Representatives 
Charlie Hales, commissioner, City of Portland
Shawn Higgins, property owner
Jim Huffman, dean, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark
Steve Janik, land use attorney, Ball, Janick
Colleen Jensen, member, Rosemont Property Owners Association
Stan Kahn, property owner
Art Lewellan, property owner
Robert Liberty, executive director, 1000 Friends of Oregon
Lloyd Marbet, property owner
Becky Miller, Oregon Taxpayers United
John L. Miller, architect and land use consultant
Stuart Miller, chief petitioner, Measure 7
Bill Moshofsky, vice president, Oregonians In Action
Mike Murray, property owner
Charles Off, president, Rosemont Property Owners Association
Larry Ofner, principal and appraiser, Ofner, Muscato and Henningson
Xander Patterson, Pacific Green Party
Mitch Rhose, land use planner
Andy Ried, property owner
Jeff Rogers, city attorney, City of Portland
Sumner Sharp, president, Oregon Chapter of the American Planning   
Association, and director of planning, Pacific Rim Resources 
Chaim Sil, property owner
Mark Simmons, speaker of the house, Oregon Legislature
Ed Sullivan, land use attorney, Preston Gates & Ellis
Donald E. Tackley, Jr., valuation consultant, Tapanen Group, Inc.
Larry Tapanen, president, The Tapanen Group
Jack Walker, commissioner, Jackson County
Bill Wiley, property owner
Rep. Max Williams, chair, Land Use and Regulatory Fairness Committee,
Oregon House of Representatives 
Donald Joe Willis, land use attorney, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt
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C.   Resource Materials
American Planning Association, Policy Guide on Takings: Land Use
Regulations and the "Takings" Challenge, (April 11, 1995)
Bill Bradbury, Chair of Joint Legislative Committee on Land Use, Joint
Legislative Committee on Land Use Report to Legislature, (March 6,
1986).
Bill Moshofsky, "Plugging a Land Use Loophole," Brainstorm,
(November 2000)
Bill Moshofsky, Oregonians In Action, Letter to Paul Leistner, Research
Director, City Club of Portland, (January 16, 2001)
Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of Oregon, A
Comparative Summary of Five Land Value Adjustment Proposals and
Comments Regarding Land Value Adjustment Proposals (December
1974).
Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of Oregon,
Compensatory Land Use Regulations: Proposal, Issues and Questions,
Planning Bulletin No. 7, (January 1975).
David Hunnicut, Oregonians In Action, "Measure 7: Debunking the
Myths," Looking Forward, (November/December 2000)
Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: Using
Federal Courts to Attack Community and Environmental Protections,
Community Rights Counsel, (April 1998)
ECONorthwest, Fiscal Impacts of Ballot Measure 7 on State and Local
Governments: An Analysis of Selected Regulations, (October 2000)
Hardy Meyers, Attorney General, State of Oregon, Written Opinion on
Measure 7 Prepared for Governor John Kitzhaber, (February 13, 2001)
Harvey M. Jacobs, State Property Rights Laws: The Impacts of Those
Laws On My Land, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, (1999)
James L. Huffman, 143 Dolan v. City of Tigard: Another Step In The
Right Direction, Environmental Law, (Winter 1995)
James L. Huffman, 153 A Coherent Takings Theory At Last: Comments
on Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Property and the Power of
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Eminent Domain, Environmental Law, (Fall 1986)
James L. Huffman, 377 The Public Interest In Private Property Rights,
Oklahoma Law Review, (Fall 1997)
James L. Huffman, 597 Judge Plager's "Sea Change" In Regulatory
Takings Law, Fordham Environmental Law Journal, (1995)
John Charles, Cascade Policy Institute, Windfalls, Wipeouts and
Measure 7: Solving the Regulatory Takings Problem, (February 2001)
John Echeverria, Georgetown University Law School, Reflections on
Oregon Measure 7 (May 3, 2001)
John Tapogna, ECO Northwest, Memo to Jeffrey G. Condit Re: Ballot
Measure 7, (September 29, 2000)
Larry Morandi, Balancing Land Use Management With Protection of
Property Rights and the Environment, State Legislative Report,
National Conference of State Legislatures, (January 1998)
Larry Morandi, Evaluating the Effects of State Takings Legislation, State
Legislative Report, National Conference of State Legislatures, (January
1998)
League of Oregon Cities, Perspectives on Measure 7, League of Oregon
Cities Newsletter, (November 2000)
Local Government Relations Division, Executive Department, State of
Oregon, Land Value Adjustment Act (aka SB 849), (July 1973)
LURF Hearings (Witness List includes Hardy Meyers, AG; Larry George
and David Hunnicut, OIA; Charlie Hales and Steve Bryant, LOC; Art
Slack, AOC; Steve Phiefer, LCDC; Jon Chandler and Melvin Mark, HBA;
Randy Tucker, 1000 Friends; Gov. Kitzhaber; Realtors Association;
Oregon Farm Bureau; Oregon Chapter of the American Planning
Association; League of Women Voters)
Mike Burton, Metro Executive Officer, Text of Speech to City Club of
Portland, (February 16, 2001)
Miller Nash LLP, Measure 7 Summit Report - Part II, (February 12,
2001)
Miller Nash LLP, Measure 7 Summit Report, (December 22, 2000)




Oregon Secretary of State, Ballot Measure 7
Oregon Secretary of State, Ballot Title and Text for Initiative Petition
#46
Oregonians In Action, "Measure 7 Completes McCall's Land Use
Planning Legacy," Looking Forward, (November/December 2000).
Paul J. Lipscomb, Presiding Judge, Marion County Circuit Court, 
Opinion of the Court on Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment
and Defendants' and Intervenor Miller's Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment, (February 22, 2001)
R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain, 28-29 (Harvard Univ. Press 1985).
Robert S. Greenberger, "Supreme Court Narrows Scope of Wetlands
Law," The Wall Street Journal, (January 10, 2001)
Stacey S. White, State Property Rights Laws: Recent Impacts and Future
Implications, Land use Law and Zoning Digest, (July 2000)
Tarso Ramos, Regulatory Takings & Private Property Rights, Western
States Center, (1995)
Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and
The Fifth Amendment, University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
(January 2000) 
Tom McCall, Governor of Oregon, Inroads Toward Positive Land Use
Management, A Land Value Adjustment Proposal (August 29, 1974).
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D.   Summary of Florida Statutes Addressing Fairness in Land Use 
Regulations
Florida
"Part I" of the Harris Act took effect on May 11, 1995. It creates a cause
of action for landowners who feel that government regulation enacted
after that date has placed an "inordinate burden" on their property,
without actually leading to a taking under the state or U.S. constitu-
tions. Unlike other compensation-based laws, this law does not stipu-
late a specific reduction in property values as a "trigger" for compen-
sation. Instead, it defines an "inordinate burden" as an action that
either denies a property owner his or her reasonable, investment-
backed expectations or vested rights, or that forces the property owner
to bear a disproportionate cost for the public good.
Under Part I, a government entity has 180 days from the date a proper-
ty owner's claim is filed to make a settlement offer and to identify the
uses to which the property in question may be put. If the owner
accepts the settlement, the claim is closed. If the owner rejects the set-
tlement, he or she can take the claim to circuit court. The courts must
then determine the validity of the claim. In addition to monetary com-
pensation, possible remedies under the act include land exchange,
issuance of the requested permit, and increased allowable densities on
other parts of a claimant's property. 
Part II, The Dispute Resolution Act, establishes a mediation process for
property rights disputes. Part II provides a separate, optional process
through which property owners may attempt to resolve their griev-
ances. This act took effect on October 1, 1995, and applies to any gov-
ernmental development order or enforcement action authorized after
that date. In what is a more relaxed standard than that of "inordinate
burden," a landowner need only feel a government action is "unfair or
"unreasonable" before pursuing this option.
Under Part II, aggrieved property owners must first exhaust all non-
judicial local government appeals. After doing so, they may request
relief from a "Special Master" who is selected based on agreement by
both property owners and government entities. The Special Master is
charged with holding a hearing and attempting to facilitate an agree-
ment between the two parties.
If the disputing parties agree to a settlement at that time (pending
approval by the appropriate government entities), the case is closed. If
the Special Master is unable to mediate an agreement between the
parties, he or she is required to make a written recommendation as to
whether the development order or enforcement action is acceptable or




E.   Oregon Statewide Planning Goals
The current statewide land use framework includes goals related to:
1. CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT—Goal 1 calls for "the opportunity for citizens to be involved
in all phases of the planning process." It requires each city and county to have a citizen
involvement program containing six components specified in the goal. It also requires
local governments to have a committee for citizen involvement (CCI) to monitor and
encourage public participation in planning.
2. LAND USE PLANNING—Goal 2outlines the basic procedures of Oregon's statewide
planning program. It says that land use decisions are to be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan, and that suitable "implementation ordinances" to put the plan's
policies into effect must be adopted. It requires that plans be based on "factual
information"; that local plans and ordinances be coordinated with those of other
jurisdictions and agencies; and that plans be reviewed periodically and amended as
needed. Goal 2 also contains standards for taking exceptions to statewide goals. An
exception may be taken when a statewide goal cannot or should not be applied to a
particular area or situation. 
3. AGRICULTURAL LANDS—Goal 3 defines "agricultural lands." It then requires counties
to inventory such lands and to "preserve and maintain" them through farm zoning.
Details on the uses allowed in farm zones are found in ORS Chapter 215 and in Oregon
Administrative Rules, Chapter 660, Division 33.
4. FOREST LANDS—This goal defines forest lands and requires counties to inventory
them and adopt policies and ordinances that will "conserve forest lands for forest uses."
5. OPEN SPACES, SCENIC ANDHISTORIC AREAS AND NATURAL RESOURCES—Goal 5
covers more than a dozen natural and cultural resources such as wildlife habitats and
wetlands. It establishes a process for each resource to be inventoried and evaluated. If a
resource or site is found to be significant, a local government has three policy choices:
preserve the resource, allow proposed uses that conflict with it, or strike some sort of a
balance between the resource and the uses that would conflict with it.
6. AIR, WATER AND LANDRESOURCES QUALITY—This goal requires local
comprehensive plans and implementing measures to be consistent with state and
federal regulations on matters such as groundwater pollution.
7. AREAS SUBJECT TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND HAZARDS—Goal 7 deals with
development in places subject to natural hazards such as floods or landslides. It requires
that jurisdictions apply "appropriate safeguards" (floodplain zoning, for example) when
planning for development there.
8. RECREATION NEEDS—This goal calls for each community to evaluate its areasand
facilities for recreation and develop plans to deal with the projected demand for them.
It also sets forth detailed standards for expedited siting of destination resorts.
9. ECONOMY OF THE STATE—Goal 9 calls for diversification and improvement of the
economy. It asks communities to inventory commercial and industrial lands, project
future needs for such lands, and plan and zone enough land to meet those needs.
10. HOUSING—This goal specifies that each city must plan for and accommodate
needed housing types, such as multifamily and manufactured housing. It requires each
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city to inventory its buildable residential lands, project future needs for such lands, and
plan and zone enough buildable land to meet those needs. It also prohibits local plans
from discriminating against needed housing types.
11. PUBLIC FACILITIES ANDSERVICES—Goal 11 calls for efficient planning of public
services such as sewers, water, law enforcement, and fire protection. The goal's central
concept is that public services should to be planned in accordance with a community's
needs and capacities rather than be forced to respond to development as it occurs.
12. TRANSPORTATION—The goal aims to provide "a safe, convenient and economic
transportation system." It asks for communities to address the needs of the
"transportation disadvantaged."
13. ENERGY—Goal 13 declares that "land and uses developed on the land shall be
managed and controlled so as to maximize the conservation of all forms of energy,
based upon sound economic principles."
14. URBANIZATION—This goal requires cities to estimate future growth and needs for
land and then plan and zone enough land to meet those needs. It calls for each city to
establish an "urban growth boundary" (UGB) to "identify and separate urbanizable land
from rural land." It specifies seven factors that must be considered in drawing up a UGB.
It also lists four criteria to be applied when undeveloped land within a UGB is to be
converted to urban uses.
15. WILLAMETTE GREENWAY—Goal 15 sets forth procedures for administering the 300
miles of greenway that protects the Willamette River.
16. ESTUARINE RESOURCES—This goal requires local governments to classify Oregon's
22 major estuaries in four categories:, natural, conservation, shallow-draft development,
and deep-draft development. It then describes types of land uses and activities that are
permissible in those "management units."
17. COASTAL SHORELANDS—The goal defines a planning area bounded by the ocean
beaches on the west and the coast highway (State Route 101 ) on the east. It specifies
how certain types of land and resources there are to be managed: major marshes, for
example, are to be protected. Sites best suited for unique coastal land uses (port
facilities, for example) are reserved for "water-dependent" or "water related" uses.
18. BEACHES AND DUNES—Goal 18 sets planning standards for development on vari-
ous types of dunes. It prohibits residential development on beaches and active fore-
dunes, but allows some other types of development if they meet key criteria. The goal
also deals with dune grading, groundwater drawdown in dunal aquifers, and the
breaching of foredunes.
19. OCEAN RESOURCES—Goal 19 aims "to conserve the long-term values, benefits, and
natural resources of the nearshore ocean and the continental shelf." It deals with
matters such as dumping of dredge spoils and discharging of waste products into the




F.   Text of Measure 7
"If the state, a political subdivision of the state, or a local government
passes or enforces a regulation that restricts the use of private real
property, and the restriction has the effect of reducing the value of a
property upon which the restriction is imposed, the property owner
shall be paid just compensation equal to the reduction in the fair
value of the property."
"For the purposes of this section, adoption or enforcement of
historically and commonly recognized nuisance laws shall not be
deemed to have caused a reduction the value of a property. The phrase
'historically and commonly recognized nuisance laws' shall be
narrowly construed in favor of a finding that just compensation is
required under this section."
"A regulating entity may impose, to the minimum extent required, a
regulation to implement a requirement of federal law without payment
of compensation under this section."
"Nothing in this 2000 Amendment shall require compensation due to a
government regulation prohibiting the use of a property for the
purpose of selling pornography, performing nude dancing, selling
alcoholic beverages, or other controlled substances, or operating a
casino or gaming parlor."
"Compensation shall be due the property owner if the regulation was
adopted, first enforced or applied after the current owner of the
property became the owner, and continues to apply to the property 90
days after the owner applies for compensation under this section."
"Definitions: For purposes of this section,
regulation shall include any law, rule, ordinance, resolution, goal, or
other enforceable enactment of government; 
real property shall include any structure built or sited on the property,
aggregate and other removable minerals, and any forest product or
other crop grown on the property; 
reduction in the fair market value shall mean the difference in the fair
market value of the property before and after application of the
regulation, and shall include the net cost to the landowner of an
affirmative obligation to protect, provide, or preserve wildlife habitat,
natural areas, wetlands, ecosystems, scenery, open space, historical,
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archaeological or cultural resources, or low income housing; and
'just compensation' shall include, if a claim for compensation is
denied or not fully paid within 90 days of filing, reasonable attorney
fees and expenses necessary to collect the compensation.
"If any phrase, clause, or part of this section is found to be invalid by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining phrases, clauses, and
parts shall remain in full force and effect."
G.   Anecdotal Evidence of Hardships Caused by Land Use Laws
In addition to the Millers, the following property owners were among
those whose experiences with Oregon land use laws were related to
your committee.
1. Boise Cascade - Commercial Logging and the Endangered Species
Act (Phil Chadsey, Legal Counsel)
In 1988, Boise Cascade acquired approximately 1,700 acres of land in
Clatsop County, Oregon. In 1990, the Northern Spotted Owl was
declared a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species
Act (ESA). The Boise Cascade property had old-growth timber with a
spotted owl nest. The State-adopted regulations, following suggested
federal guidelines, prohibited logging on 70 acres surrounding such a
nest. This affected 65 acres of the Boise Cascade property (60 of which
could have been logged). At that time, the value of the protected
was approximately $3,000,000.
In 1992, Boise Cascade sold all but 65 acres of the property, holding on
to the acreage surrounding the spotted owl nest. In the same year, the
State re-designated the restricted acreage to 56 acres surrounding the
owl's nest, allowing Boise Cascade to log 4 acres of the formerly
restricted property.
Boise Cascade has been litigating this case since 1992, arguing
that the physical occupation of the owls was a taking. In 1996, the owls
abandoned the site. By that time, the value of the property had
depreciated considerably, due to the decline in timber value. In 1997, a
jury awarded $1.8 million to the company for the temporary taking of
the property, between 1992 and 1997. The verdict was reversed on
appeal over the issue of whether the case was "ripe" for litigation
because Boise Cascade had not applied to the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service for an incidental take permit under the ESA for the owls,
which, if granted would have allowed the state to have authorized the
logging under state law. The case continues to be tied up in litigation.
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2. Donald Tackley's Property in Deschutes County
In May 1995, Donald Tackley purchased a lot in the Deschutes River
Recreational Ranch subdivision. The subdivision is about 5 miles south
of Sunriver and is made up of lots about 1 acre in size. Mr. Tackley paid
$15,000 for his lot and then made improvements, including a well and
septic system, with the intention of eventually building a house.
Before he was prepared to build, the county proposed a minimum lot
area requirement of 1.5 acres to build new dwellings. This requirement
was proposed to protect the area residents because, at the existing
density, the aquifer, upon which the residents depend for drinking
water, was expected to become polluted. The alternative would have
been to build a sewer system, but the area residents were unwilling to
support this.
In response to this re-zoning, Mr. Tackley sold his property to someone
who was prepared to build before the proposed lot area requirement
would take effect and recovered his investment, but he felt that others
might not have been so lucky.
As "compensation" for the lost right to build on his property, the
county offered him (and other affected property owners) the right to
purchase other land on or near Highway 97. He would have had to pay
market price for the land, and would have received no discount or
monetary allowances in compensation for the diminished value of his
previous lot. He declined the offer.
According to Mr. Tackley, the county subsequently did not impose the
1.5 acre requirement, but he did not anticipate this change in position
and had already sold his property.
3. Charlie Hoff and Colleen Jensen's property in the Rosemont area of
Clackamas Co.
In 1978 the Hoffs and the Jensens purchased 53 acres of land in the
Rosemont area between Lake Oswego and West Linn. The original
zoning allowed residences to be built on two-acre lots. At this time the
area was relatively undeveloped, and there were existing houses on lots
as small as half an acre. In other parts of the area to the south, the
zoning required a five-acre minimum to build new houses.
In 1980 an EFU-20 (exclusive farm use, 20-acre) zone was applied to
the property. This property was not viable as farmland because it
lacked an irrigation source, and there was no existing commercial
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farming in the immediate vicinity. The EFU-20 designation precluded
residential development. 
In the early 1990s the Hoffs and Jensens, along with other property
owners in the area, established the Rosemont Property Owner's
Association. This group of about 20 property owners hired professional
planners to design a plan, and petitioned Metro for inclusion in
Portland's Urban Growth Boundary (UGB). This is a complex and
costly process. The plan covers a total area of 750 acres, and includes a
mixture of densities and uses (including commercial). The average
density of the plan is approximately 10 units per acre. 
In 2000 Metro extended the UGB to include the Rosemont Property
Owners' property, but development is still not allowed. Currently the
UGB inclusion of the property is being contested by the City of Lake
Oswego, which alleges that the development of this property will
overburden its schools, create sewer problems, and increase traffic.
According to the property owners, Lake Oswego is closing schools,
there are a variety of solutions to the sewage disposal issue, and the
area has excellent access to Interstate 205. 
More than 20 years after it was purchased for development, this
property remains undeveloped and the property owners have received
no return on their investment. Mr. Hoff and Ms. Jensen indicated that
they would be satisfied if they could build two-acre homes on the
property, as permitted at the time they bought the property in 1978.
H.   Compensation Provisions of the Job Creation and Wage  
Enhancement Act of 1995 (Passed by U.S. House of
Representatives, Died in Senate)
SEC. 203. RIGHT TO COMPENSATION.
(a) In General. The Federal Government shall compensate an 
owner of property whose use of any portion of that property 
has been limited by an agency action, under a specified 
regulatory law, that diminishes the fair market value of that 
portion by 20 percent or more. The amount of the 
compensation shall equal the diminution in value that resulted
from the agency action. If the diminution in value of a portion 
of that property is greater than 50 percent, at the option of the 
owner, the Federal Government shall buy that portion of the 
property for its fair market value.
(b) Duration of Limitation on Use. Property with respect to which 
compensation has been paid under this Act shall not thereafter
be used contrary to the limitation imposed by the agency 
action, even if that action is later rescinded or otherwise 
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vitiated. However, if that action is later rescinded or otherwise 
vitiated, and the owner elects to refund the amount of the 
compensation, adjusted for inflation, to the Treasury of the 
United States, the property may be so used.
SEC. 204. EFFECT OF STATE LAW.
If a use is a nuisance as defined by the law of a State or is already pro-
hibited under a local zoning ordinance, no compensation shall be
made under this division with respect to a limitation on that use.
SEC. 205. EXCEPTIONS.
(a) Prevention of Hazard to Health or Safety or Damage to Specific
Property. No compensation shall be made under this division 
with respect to an agency action the primary purpose of which
is to prevent an identifiable 
(1) hazard to public health or safety; or
(2) damage to specific property other than the property whose use is   
limited.
(b) Navigation Servitude. No compensation shall be made under 
this division with respect to an agency action pursuant to the 
Federal navigation servitude, as defined by the courts of the 
United States, except to the extent such servitude is 
interpreted to apply to wetlands.
SEC. 206. PROCEDURE.
(a) Request Of Owner. An owner seeking compensation under this
division shall make a written request for compensation to the 
agency whose agency action resulted in the limitation. No such
request may be made later than 180 days after the owner 
receives actual notice of that agency action.
(b) Negotiations. The agency may bargain with that owner to 
establish the amount of the compensation. If the agency and 
the owner agree to such an amount, the agency shall promptly 
pay the owner the amount agreed upon.
(c) Choice Of Remedies. If, not later than 180 days after the 
written request is made, the parties do not come to an 
agreement as to the right to and amount of compensation, the 
owner may choose to take the matter to binding arbitration or 
seek compensation in a civil action. 
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(d) Arbitration. The procedures that govern the arbitration shall, 
as nearly as practicable, be those established under title 9, 
United States Code, for arbitration proceedings to which that 
title applies. An award made in such arbitration shall include a 
reasonable attorney's fee and other arbitration costs (including
appraisal fees). The agency shall promptly pay any award 
made to the owner.
(e) Civil Action. An owner who does not choose arbitration, or 
who does not receive prompt payment when required by this 
section, may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action against 
the agency. An owner who prevails in a civil action under this 
section shall be entitled to, and the agency shall be liable for, a 
reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs (including 
appraisal fees). The court shall award interest on the amount 
of any compensation from the time of the limitation.
(f) Source Of Payments. Any payment made under this section to 
an owner, and any judgment obtained by an owner in a civil 
action under this section shall, notwithstanding any other pro
vision of law, be made from the annual appropriation of the 
agency whose action occasioned the payment or judgment. If 
the agency action resulted from a requirement imposed by 
another agency, then the agency making the payment or satis
fying the judgment may seek partial or complete
reimbursement from the appropriated funds of the other 
agency. For this purpose the head of the agency concerned 
may transfer or reprogram any appropriated funds available to
the agency. If insufficient funds exist for the payment or to 
satisfy the judgment, it shall be the duty of the head of the 
agency to seek the appropriation of such funds for the next 
fiscal year.
SEC. 207. LIMITATION.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any obligation of the
United States to make any payment under this division shall be subject
to the availability of appropriations.
SEC. 208. DUTY OF NOTICE TO OWNERS.
Whenever an agency takes an agency action limiting the use of private
property, the agency shall give appropriate notice to the owners of that
property directly affected explaining their rights under this division
and the procedures for obtaining any compensation that may be due
to them under this division.
SEC. 209. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
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(a) EFFECT ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COMPENSATION- 
Nothing in this division shall be construed to limit any right to 
compensation that exists under the Constitution or under 
other laws of the United States.
(b) Effect Of Payment. Payment of compensation under this 
division (other than when the property is bought by the 
Federal Government at the option of the owner) shall not 
confer any rights on the Federal Government other than the 
limitation on use resulting from the agency action.
SEC. 210. DEFINITIONS.
For the purposes of this division
(1) the term 'property' means land and includes the right to use or
receive water;
(2) a use of property is limited by an agency action if a particular 
legal right to use that property no longer exists because of the 
action;
(3) the term 'agency action' has the meaning given that term in 
section 551 of title 5, United States Code, but also includes the 
making of a grant to a public authority conditioned upon an 
action by the recipient that would constitute a limitation if 
done directly by the agency;
(4) the term 'agency' has the meaning given that term in section 
551 of title 5, United States Code;
(5) the term 'specified regulatory law' means--
(A) section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 
U.S.C. 1344);
(B) the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.);
(C) title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3801 et 
seq.); or
(D) with respect to an owner's right to use or receive water only--
(i) the Act of June 17, 1902, and all Acts amendatory thereof or 
supplementary thereto, popularly called the 'Reclamation Acts'
(43 U.S.C. 371 et seq.);
(ii) the Federal Land Policy Management Act (43 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.); or
(iii) section 6 of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources 
Planning Act of 1974 (16 U.S.C. 1604);
(6) the term 'fair market value' means the most probable price at 
which property would change hands, in a competitive and 
open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being 
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
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reasonable knowledge of relevant facts, at the time the agency 
action occurs;
(7) the term 'State' includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and any other territory or possession of the United States; and
(8) the term 'law of the State' includes the law of a political subdi
vision of a State.
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